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 Cuba is the global leader in practicing agroecology, but agroecology is just one 
component of a larger climate-ready socio-economic system. Degrowth economics address the 
need to constrain our total global metabolism to within biophysical limits, while allowing 
opportunity and resources for "underdeveloped" countries to rebuild themselves under new 
terms. Degrowth recognizes the role of overdeveloped countries in surpassing the ecological 
limits of our planet at the cost of wellbeing for billions of dispossessed people within and 
between countries. Cuba's circumstances during and following the Special Period exemplify both 
sides of the degrowth scenario, as well as demonstrating policy and grassroots adaptations to 
massive economic contraction, and potential forms/paths of "development" for the "Global 
South" within degrowth. This scenario demonstrates the theory and practices of 1) a 
catastrophic transition out of highly industrialized agriculture and 2) a path of recovery toward 
a dignified quality of life while under serious economic and political constraints, providing 
lessons for both the Global "North" and "South". This case study of a socialist country uses 
historical and dialectical materialism to argue that an effective degrowth transformation is 
encompassed by and most effectively pursued through the revolutionary socialist struggle to 
transform society. The analysis of Cuba's agroecological story demonstrates the significance of 
the following characteristics in revolutionary systems of production for achieving just standards 
of living for global humanity: a planned economy with the nationalization of resources and 
centralizing planning, and worker’s democracy enacted through mass movements, organized 
democratic structures, and a conscious revolutionary leadership. 
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Introduction 
 
This paper will explore the degrowth mission by analyzing key Cuban 
food production adaptations across household, national, and international 
scales. Cuba and Cuban agroecology represent one of the most fundamental 
case studies to the degrowth field. The Cuban case study highlights how modes 
of production shape politics and society, as well as concrete structures we must 
adopt in our drive for resilience. Cuba’s history demonstrates three stages of 
resilient transformation: how degrowth transitions might occur, how alternative 
agricultural modes of production might look, and what further steps need be 
taken to optimize a new, resilient mode of production. However, Cuban 
agroecology is a product of a politically incohesive anti-imperialist movement 
and shows such limitations. Cuba does not currently represent a complete 
socialist food system due to its lack of democratic planning and its national 
constraints. Both politically and ecologically, it is not desirable to try to directly 
mimic the Cuban model in other places. However, by exploring the conditions 
which resulted in such a strong alternative and its particular weaknesses, we 
can inform both the socialist and degrowth movements of the future.  
Through the case of Cuba, this paper argues that the degrowth mission 
is the search for the “rational ecology” which underlies the material basis of 
Marxist thought. Agroecology, specifically, is a nexus for emerging rational 
ecology. Degrowth ideas have been a historical component of the revolutionary 
socialist project. The degrowth movement is finding that it must challenge the 
current power balance if it is to occur on a sufficiently impactful scale. Marxism 
and the revolutionary socialist struggle are based upon empowered democracy 
in which people have not just the right, but the ability to pursue collectively 
decided goals that put people over profit, and is rooted in the unavoidably 
material relation of people to society to planet. 
This paper seeks to provide the fields of Marxism, Marxist ecology, and 
degrowth with an analysis of the historical and modern conditions of Cuban 
agroecology in order to inform the necessary steps and mechanisms for 
defending and expanding ecologically rational alternatives to our crisis-ridden 
global food system. To do so, the first section will define and connect several 
disparate theoretical threads, first defining the broad mission of the degrowth 
movement, articulating the fundamentals of Marxist ecology, then clarifying the 
role of agriculture within Marxist thought and the specific question of the social 
role of the rural populations in a socialist revolution, also known as the Agrarian 
Question. These theoretical pieces define the framework through which the 
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material history of Cuba, through the lens of agriculture, or humanity’s first and 
most material relation with nature, will be investigated. Evolving Modes of 
Production will trace the modes of production that have defined Cuban history 
and their associated political and ecological conditions. Historical materialism 
used in this fashion concretely informs the development of conditions we seek 
to either change, maintain, or spread. The third section draws political lessons 
from the Cuban Revolution that directly impacted the successes and limitations 
of the Cuban food system. It argues that the planned economy, using 
nationalization and centralized planning, was a key mechanism that enabled the 
growth and implementation of agroecology, but its weaknesses, due to specific 
political conditions, undermined both the direct ecological adaptations and the 
broader supporting system that the planned economy was capable of 
maintaining. The weaknesses of the planned economy rose out of the political 
conditions caused by the lack of worker’s democracy. Therefore, mass 
movements, democratic organizations, and a revolutionary party are necessary 
to correct the limitations of the Cuban system and Cuban agroecology, and to 
defend and extend the gains into a full worker’s democracy. Lastly the 
conclusions will reconnect the political and economic arguments to the material 
ecological condition from which they arise, in order to point degrowth activists 
towards the socialist project and to clarify the ecological direction of the 
socialist project. 
 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Degrowth 
 
 Capitalism’s metabolism is colliding with nine planetary boundaries - 
climate change, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, disruption of 
the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, land use changes, 
biodiversity loss, aerosol loading in the atmosphere, and chemical pollution 
(Foster 2000). The environmental crisis is a result of the metabolic rift between 
the biophysical limits of the planet and the current system of production - 
capitalism’s - voracious appetite. Degrowth is the exploration of structural 
changes necessary in global political-economic systems to combat the global 
environmental and human-welfare crises. Specifically, degrowth is defined as “a 
collective and deliberative process aimed at the equitable downscaling of the 
overall capacity to produce and consume and of the role of markets and 
commercial exchanges as a central organising principle of human lives” to 
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operate within the planet’s ecological capacity (Schneider, Kallis, and Martinez-
Alier 2010; Sekulova et al. 2013)  
Degrowth explicitly targets the overdevelopment of central capitalist 
countries that occurred at the cost of other countries, internal disparities, and 
common global resources. Capitalism’s emphasis on products’ exchange values 
rather than use-values drastically increases economic throughput without 
meeting human need, equalizing distribution, or ensuring universal welfare. 
Daly (1996) argues that material throughput - that is, resource intensity - can 
decrease to a manageable steady-state level in which qualitative, not 
quantitative, improvements in the economic, social, and cultural sphere still 
take place. As Kallis (2011) succinctly puts it “less income but more welfare”. 
Absolute consumption will be limited by planetary boundaries, while ensuring 
justice and welfare for populations who have been exploited and abused at the 
hands of capitalism for centuries. The goal of degrowth is to head off an 
abrupt, or even catastrophic, contraction of the economy due to ecological 
collapse (that is, production of necessary goods and services for life) by 
planning a smooth downshifting of the economy through collective, 
institutionalized changes - a “prosperous way down” (Odum and Odum 2008). 
Kallis (2011) proposes that “decrease of throughput variables and increase of 
welfare variables (or an aggregate of them) may indicate progress in the 
direction of sustainable degrowth.” Despite being an “underdeveloped country”, 
Cuba surpasses the welfare status and sustainability score of supposed 
“developed countries” (Brundenius 2009) including the U.S., and, as such, 
makes for a useful degrowth study (Sekulova et al. 2013; Boillat, Gerber, and 
Funes-Monzote 2012; Cederlöf 2016; Borowy 2013). 
 
Marxist Ecology 
 
 Ecological literature has recently re-illuminated the foundational 
connection between modern ecology, degrowth, and Marxist theory (see 
Bellemy-Foster, O’Conner, Kovel). Marx, Engels, and other early thinkers 
developed their theories about capitalism and society in reference to rapidly 
evolving conceptions of science and ecology. Contemporary cases of capital-
driven environmental exploitation highlighted, for them, the ultimately material 
basis for human existence on this planet and the rising conflict between human 
society and the environment, thus leading to the questions: have humans 
always existed in conflict with their environment? What are the historical roots 
of these environmental crises and how can we create a new, harmonious 
relationship with the wider world? - in the 1800’s. Marx and Engels’ deep study 
  
4 
of both human society and the external conditions we live in resulted in the first 
proposal for “sustainable development” long before modern consciousness 
about climate change came into play (Bellamy Foster and Clark 2016).  
 The critical political economy of Marx and Engels is rooted in the concept 
of “modes of production”, which, at its core, reflects, “the simple assumption 
that human societies get their means of subsistence from the environment, and 
the way this is obtained and divided among members of the society will, in 
turn, influence and shape all aspects of the society” (Haila and Levins 1992). 
Marxist perspectives view environmental states and processes as the product of 
historical material processes (historical materialism) and as an active participant 
in the ongoing dialectical ecological processes between systems and 
components (dialectical materialism). Humans and human society are one, 
albeit a conscious and powerful, component of that relationship. Marx describes 
the labor-and-production process as the mediating factor between humanity 
and nature in a dialectic, or co-evolutionary, process between the elements of 
labor, production, and “external means of production” (Bellamy Foster and 
Clark 2016). The critical relationship is the triadic, non-alienated relationship 
between humanity--social metabolism--universal metabolism of nature (Bellamy 
Foster and Clark 2016). For the social metabolism, or the consumption rate 
necessary to reproduce humanity, to remain capable of supporting humanity, 
neither element, humanity nor social metabolism, can become disassociated 
(alienated) from the biophysical realities of the planet. The planetary ecosystem 
facilitated the evolution of humanity and human society, but does not enable us 
to expand beyond those limitations to material existence.  
 Capitalism has thrown the social metabolism out of alignment with the 
universal metabolism through the universal commodification of products. 
Commodities are defined by and produced for their exchange-values, not use, 
creating wealth that becomes the new means of production in a cycle of growth 
that outpaces human need and the natural reproduction of resources alike. The 
first large-scale effect of capitalism on the social history of nature was the 
transformation of relations in the countryside (agriculture), the second the 
increased production of raw material for export on a world-wide basis that 
fortified and expanded old patterns of colonial trade (Haila and Levins 1992). 
Today, modern financial capital is additionally removed from either material 
investment or material production, being based in abstract forms that represent 
wealth, such as money, credit, and stocks, which are immaterial and thus 
insatiable. 
 Neither the social metabolism nor the external means of production are 
constants; the “environment” of a society is but a “historically changing 
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complex of variables” and as such vastly different social formations have 
occupied similar environmental conditions across history (Haila and Levins 
1992). At the same time, a given mode of production can span many 
ecosystems. Human activity under modern capitalism has developed the 
capacity to modify the geophysical processes that “determine the basic 
boundary conditions of life on earth” (Haila and Levins 1992). There are social 
and ecological conditions unique to Cuba which shaped its trajectory leading 
into and out of the 1959 Revolution. Nonetheless, there are key lessons from 
the international movement that could have informed the challenges of the 
Cuban experience, as well as lessons uniquely possible under the specific Cuban 
circumstances which can inform any other socialist or environmentalist 
movement moving forward - especially on agroecology and alternative 
agricultures. The successful worker’s revolution is recognized to be international 
for a number of reasons: 1) capitalism is a global system and to be able to 
overthrow it in one country requires we overthrow it in all, 2) international 
collaboration can use one’s strengths to aid another’s weakness, and 3) 
materially and ecologically, society functions on a fundamentally global scale.  
 Marx and Engels’ ecological cases in British and Peruvian soil health were 
already illustrating the planetary reach of capitalist degradation (Marx 1975). 
The classically discussed rupture between town and country is ultimately a 
metabolic one. The country depletes its natural wealth (trees, soil, water, labor) 
for use in the towns, which are socially-organized under capitalism such that 
they cannot consciously return those finite extracted resources (nutrients, 
energy, etc.) back into the biophysical system where and as they are needed. 
In Marx’s time, the driving capitalist forces of the British Empire were depleting 
Irish soil nutrients by forcing food exports thus sparking a manufactured famine 
that decimated the Irish population (Magdoff, Foster, and Buttel 2000; Foster 
2000). Capitalists created a global trade in South American soil nutrients (as 
guano) once the regional efforts to rebuild depleted English soils maxed-out 
continental graveyard and battlefield bone supplies. The international guano 
trade profited highly at the cost of local guano-dependent agriculture, Chinese 
slave labor, and a manufactured proxy war (Bellamy Foster and Clark 2016). 
Marx and Engels’ nuanced conclusions about structural environmental 
destruction remain absolutely relevant in the face of contemporary issues. Their 
work calls for a “rational ecology” between humanity and nature.  
 Even the concept of exchange or international trade is not inherently 
antithetical to a sustainable society. Exchange is still the most effective way of 
changing on object into another: “a system of trade allows the movement of 
surpluses from areas of abundance to areas of need and is therefore a large-
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scale protection against even regional production disasters… though in the 
current system they only flow where profitable” (Haila and Levins 1992). 
Ecologically, trade is a material process which mediates between regions, 
allowing cultures to be less dependent on local conditions, and spreading 
means of environmental modification (Haila and Levins 1992). One of Cuba’s 
biggest political and economic challenges has been the question of trade, 
limited both by the US embargo, the trade biases and ultimate collapse of the 
USSR, and the lack of other international worker’s democracies. Long term 
resilience requires that a rational ecological balance be struck, which is only 
possible when all those affected have a voice and the primary motivation force 
is not raw profit.  
 Marxist ecology helps to clarify the specific history of environmental 
conditions by determining the ecological relationship between the means of 
production and the current forms of human society as they exist within an 
external material environment. In the agricultural example, affluent economies 
continue increasing the over-usage of agricultural inputs to cover for the 
declining productivity of agriculture land. However the economic conditions 
under which this is a viable response become stricter as the ecological crisis 
builds (Haila and Levins 1992). Cuba during the Special Period is one of the first 
concrete examples of this agricultural bubble popping economically and 
ecologically. Analyzing the material history subsequently aids us in shaping a 
transition, and a system, in which social reproduction does not preclude the 
reproduction of the planetary ecosystem. Thanks to the conscious human 
factor, “ the carrying capacity of nature relative to human populations is not a 
constant but a historical variable” (Haila and Levins 1992).  
 As such, exploring the ecological legacy of semi-socialist countries such 
as Cuba provides valuable lessons to socialist, environmentalist, and degrowth 
movements. The Cuban case study has several overlapping elements: a human-
oriented planned economy, an energy descent scenario, and alternative modes 
of production rising from dual environmental and economic crises. The Cuban 
case study is particularly relevant for technological degrowth - that is, 
alternatives to resource-intensive technological solutions - in absolute 
consumption reduction, and the necessary policy emphasis on a socially-
embedded economy. Analysis of what Marx called the metabolic rift between 
the universal metabolism of nature and the social metabolism of a given means 
of production shows that capitalism is incapable of resolving environmental 
crises, and a new economic, political, and social system is necessary to halt, 
reverse, or even survive the current ecological descent (Bellamy Foster and 
Clark 2016). For Cuba, analyzing the socialist aspects of the state allows us to 
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understand: 1) the circumstances in which Cuba, aided by partial socialist 
elements, achieved the highest sustainability-welfare balance of any country, 
and 2) the weaknesses of non-worker’s democracies in resolving societal crises 
including environmental destruction. 
 
Why Agriculture? In Ecological and Marxist Theory  
 
The advance of agriculture is neither universal nor inevitable.” 
(Haila and Levins 1992) 
 
 Agriculture is the basis for the material reproduction of human society. 
Though technology advances and different goods become necessary to live in a 
given society (ex: it is not possible to function in many parts of America without 
a car), humans still need to consume food to reproduce both individuals and 
society day-to-day. Humans interact with our physical environment to obtain 
nutrients and energy and, in turn, impact the composition and processes of the 
broader environment. The human factor is unique: “characteristics acquired by 
natural selection made it possible for humans to establish a new, social mode of 
existence in which human individuals are not immediately subjected to the 
environment, but the relationships are mediated through social groups kept 
together by behavioral skills on which culture is based. With these permanent 
groups a new type of history started, and assessing the degree of liberation 
from ecological conditions reached by human societies in different historical 
periods” (Haila and Levins 1992). That the contradictions of Cuba’s economic 
crisis was most profoundly felt in their agricultural capacity is no coincidence, 
nor that their degrowth revolution centered on food needs and led to the 
explosion of a materialist agroecological system. Modern food systems lie at the 
nexus of human biophysical need, ecological capacity, and social organization in 
a way that the fundamental complexities and contradictions illustrate incredibly 
well the nuanced connections of Marxist materialism.  
 The development of agriculture caused a systemic and extensive human 
impact on the environment (Haila and Levins 1992). Conscious decisions and 
actions created the new required social formations and practices to pursue 
sedentary agriculture (Haila and Levins 1992). Two preconditions for the 
current environmental crises eventually developed out of exchange: social and 
technological mechanisms overshadow the significance of local conditions in 
explaining how human populations gain subsistence (Haila and Levins 1992) 
and elements of nature (as goods) become reified, in that their meaning for 
society cannot be deduced from their natural characteristics (Ellen, 1982).  
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 Agriculture has helped defined social organization since the transition out 
of hunter-gatherer cultures. Engels (2010) describes in The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property and the State how surplus was possible for the first 
time in human history with the advent of agriculture. The presence of surplus 
caused conflict over its control and eventually the rise of class society with 
numerous social practices, such as the oppression of women, developed to 
control ownership and succession of wealth created out of agricultural and 
labor surplus. Marx’s critique of capitalist production describes how agriculture 
was the first point of capitalist social relations (Saito 2017; Magdoff, Foster, and 
Buttel 2000). Enclosure of lands cut off rural populations from the means of 
their own material reproduction. “Freed” laborers flooded the cities where they 
could only secure their survival by selling their labor. While subsistence 
agriculture requires the diversity of crops for qualitatively distinct uses, trade 
“makes crops interconvertible so that a single product can become many” 
(Haila and Levins 1992). The tension between exchange-values and use-values 
in commodity production, plus the increasing drive to expand, forces capitalism 
to produce without meeting people’s most basic material needs. All the while, 
the system undermining the very conditions of production, “the tiller and the 
soil” (Marx and Engels 1988). By massively increasing the productive capacity 
of agriculture at the cost of the land and the laborer, modern agriculture 
creates the conditions, both means and demand, for its own replacement (Haila 
and Levins 1992).  
 Therefore, the ecological contradictions of agricultural production inform 
the remaining conditions of production, and vice versa. The dialectics of 
ecology remind us that society can only stray so far from material realities 
before conditions snap back, whether as a managed or catastrophic degrowth 
scenario. Agriculture, as the most fundamental labor connection between 
human and environment, is the clearest illustration of our place inside the 
ecological context. Labor organization between rural and urban in a country 
with fully capitalist social relations is simple - proletariat workers, capitalist 
owners. However, the competitive global reach of capitalism has trapped 
colonial countries in an in-between stage of not-fully-capitalist but no-longer-
feudal. Both pre-revolutionary Russia and Cuba were such countries. The 
details of social organization of labor in such contexts have crucial political 
implications for a transition from capitalist to socialist modes of production. The 
Russian Revolution answered this Agrarian Question. The Cuban Revolution did 
not employ its lessons. By breaking down the social organization of agriculture 
prior to and following the Cuban Revolution, we can apply those lessons today 
  
9 
in the potential counterrevolution from the planned economy to capitalist 
relations anew.  
 
The Agrarian Question 
 
 Food production and land redistribution has been a central organizing 
demand in all of the major socialist revolutions, from Russia to China, Spain, 
and Cuba. The land as the ultimate source of material reproduction plays an 
explicit role in Marxist thought. International theory existed that could have 
informed the challenges of Cuba’s rural and anti-imperialist struggle from a 
historically-tested Marxist position, but the ideological confusion of the anti-
imperialist struggle prevented the wide-scale adoption of this theoretical 
understanding. Lenin (1951) calls for the proletariat to carry the class struggle 
into the countryside as “vanguard of all the working and exploited people, as 
their leader in the struggle for the overthrow of the exploiters”. The analysis of 
labor roles and social power in the Theses on the Agrarian Question argue that 
the rural peasantry cannot achieve liberation under either feudal or capitalist 
relations, nor can the industrial proletariat achieve their “mission of 
emancipating mankind from the yoke of capital and from wars” if they confine 
their fight to their own urban conditions (Lenin 1951).  
 As in Russia and Cuba, the intertwined nature of capitalism (monopolizing 
urban manufacturing and financial investment) and feudalism (monopolizing 
rural land control) prevented a national bourgeois from being strong or self-
interested enough to push through the democratic revolution by which 
capitalism ascended to power in core countries like England. Trotsky succinctly 
described the situation, “the complete victory of the democratic revolution in 
Russia is conceivable only in the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
leaning on the peasantry. The dictatorship of the proletariat, which would 
inevitably place on the order of the day not only democratic but socialistic tasks 
as well, would at the same time give a powerful impetus to the international 
socialist revolution” (Trotsky 2010). This concept of “Permanent Revolution” 
rested on the idea that an underdeveloped country need not pass through the 
same sequence of stages which brought the core capitalist countries to the 
brink of socialist revolution (i.e. the full development of capitalism). The 
political conditions for revolution are not automatically in sync with the 
economic preconditions for socialism. Such countries can combine the elements 
of both “backward” and “advanced” countries (combined and uneven 
development) and spring forward two steps in one - win both the democratic 
and socialist revolutions. There is one caveat with crucial implications for 
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countries like Russia and Cuba: “only the “victory of the proletariat in the 
[advanced countries] could protect Russia from bourgeois restoration and 
assure it the possibility of rounding out the establishment of socialism” (Trotsky 
2010).  
 This concept was formulated out of the learned experiences of the Russian 
Revolution, especially the successful orientation to the peasantry, their class 
concerns and their relative social weight. However, the repeated rejection of 
this lesson by the main socialist organizations in Cuba shaped their revolution. 
Pre- and post-Revolution narratives argued that the anti-imperialist movement 
was carried through on the back of the peasantry, for they made the guerrilla 
war possible. In contrast, the Agrarian Question clarifies the roles of various 
rural classes in the proletarian revolution given the conditions of an incomplete 
bourgeois revolution, as in Cuba, like in Russia. As the peasantry is dispersed 
across the country, they must rely on the cities as key junctions. Different 
peasant classes (below) and various economic and ecological conditions in 
regions differentiate their interests, whereas the conditions of the urban 
proletariate converge in standardized conditions. The necessary economic links 
between regions are the markets and the railways, but both reside in the hands 
of the cities. To “tear itself away from the restrictions of the village and to 
generalise its own [class] interests, the peasantry inescapably falls into political 
dependence upon the city” (Taaffe 2000). The heterogeneous social relations 
amongst peasantry indicates the class they will naturally seek in political 
alliance (Taaffe 2000). By describing the natural inclinations of each rural class, 
Lenin (1951) reinforces that the peasantry cannot be the driving force to 
conquer power in a socialist revolution. 
 Three rural class constitute the majority of the rural population in 
capitalist countries. The agricultural proletariat, semi-proletarians, and small 
peasantry all stand to gain from the victory of the proletariat who would bring 
deliverance from the burdens of their former oppressors and material 
improvements to their conditions and their freedoms (Lenin 1950). As 
corroborated by the experiences of the Russian Revolution, these three groups 
are economically, socially, and culturally interested in the victory of socialism, 
but only capable of giving resolute support to the proletariat after winning 
power, after it has dealt resolutely with the big landowners and capitalists and 
the rural people see, in practice, the organized leadership of the revolutionary 
proletariat (Lenin 1951). Further peasant classes with distinct class interests 
include the middle peasantry and big peasantry whose interests do not seem to 
align immediately with those of the proletariat. The private property of the 
middle peasant cannot practically be abolished immediately, but this class can 
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be incorporated into collective production pursued “with extreme caution and 
only very gradually, by the force of example, without any coercion”. The big 
peasant, similarly, is not the immediate focus of the new proletariat state 
unless they resist the power of working and exploited people. In contrast, the 
big landowners systemically exploit wage-labor and parts of the peasantry, do 
not themselves engage in manual labor, and are often either descended from 
feudal lords or are rich financial magnates: in other words, the “exploiters and 
parasites”. “Their” lands should be confiscated immediately and unreservedly 
without compensation which would only be “the imposition of new tribute upon 
the masses of working and exploited people” (Lenin 1951).  
 The makeup of rural labor in underdeveloped countries like Cuba and 
Russia informs the transition from for-profit production under private property 
to communal socially-driven production. The decentralization of land 
distribution to the peasantry in Russia came from the country’s delayed 
development, “it is only in relatively rare and exceptional cases that state farms 
have been organised on the former estates which the proletarian state runs at 
its own expense, converting the former wage-labourers into workers for the 
state and members of the Soviets, which administer the state… in the case of 
the advanced capitalist countries it would be correct to keep most of the big 
agricultural enterprises intact and to conduct them on the lines of the “state 
farms” in Russia….it would, however, be grossly erroneous to exaggerate or to 
stereotype this rule and never to permit the free grant of part of the land that 
belonged to the expropriated expropriators to the neighbouring small and 
sometimes middle peasants.” (Lenin 1951). 
 It is the state of labor which determines the appropriate social 
organization of agriculture under the early stages of socialism and, on occasion, 
the seeming contradictory distribution of land to the peasantry. Cuba, trapped 
in an exploitive colonial relation with the US, was never allowed to resolve its 
feudal and rural issues. It had only a partial rural proletariat. Without the 
existence of “a fully developed and revolutionarily conscious rural proletariat 
with considerable experience of trade union and political organisation behind it” 
the preservation of large-scale agriculture as state farms can “only discredit the 
proletarian government…. the utmost caution must be exercised and the most 
thorough preparations made when state farms are set up” (Lenin 1951). Cuba 
took the state farm form without its underlying organization. Between the 
“united” movement of antagonistic classes in the revolution itself, and the self-
defensive bureaucratic class nature of the USSR by this point in history, Cuba 
was predisposed to mimic the forms but not adopt the foundations of socialist 
organization of society. Instead, as international theory learned and taught, the 
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state should rather grant free use of land to those with the economic and 
technical basis for production at a given point in time. The worker’s state must 
collaborate more closely with the peasantry and rural proletariat than simply 
granting them land, for agriculture forms the material basis of the urban 
proletariat and the whole of society. Most immediately, implements and stocks 
of the large landowners, similarly confiscated as state property, can be granted 
to the local peasantry after meeting the needs of the big state farms as one 
part of the “immediate and considerable improvement in [the] conditions [of 
the labouring and most exploited masses in the countryside] at the expense of 
the exploiters” (Lenin 1951).  
 More broadly, however, the reorganization of all industry along lines of 
large-scale collective production and on a modern technical basis (including 
both social and ecological knowledge) sets the conditions for a reciprocal, rift-
spanning relationship between town and country, in which cities are capable of 
rendering radical technical and social assistance to the scattered rural 
populations such that it builds the material basis to boost the productivity of 
agricultural labor in order to meet human and urban needs (Lenin 1951). 
Through such relations, the proletariat can encourage small farmers through 
example and self-interest to voluntarily adopt large-scale, collective, and 
mechanized agriculture as a “free association of producers”.  
 But the agriculture that the proletariat might encourage the small farmers 
to adopt is not necessarily the most industrialized or high-input possible. 
Degrowth can occur on an unprecedented scale when producers and 
consumers together have the right and capability to decide the balance to strike 
for a rational ecology. Capitalism has developed humanity’s productive capacity 
as never before. Democratic control of research, production, and distribution 
means that members of the system can collectively chose and share 
appropriate technologies. Agroecological and environmental knowledge has 
developed in direct response to the conditions developed by capitalist hyper-
resource intensity. No single person like Castro or small group like a ruling 
bureaucracy is capable of thinking up and implementing a revolutionary system 
of production. Under a worker’s democracy, society will be able to unleash the 
full creative and productive forces of humanity to confront the issues we have 
inherited from capitalism and remake society as one which meets the needs 
and potential of the whole without inhibiting the needs and potential of the 
future.  
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Combined Framework 
 
 This work argues that the degrowth project is encompassed within the 
Marxist framework and the socialist struggle through the material medium of 
ecology. Both Marxist and degrowth theory alike is fundamentally based in the 
material processes between human society and the broader environment. 
Therefore, we can analyze degrowth through agroecology/agriculture cases as 
being the fundamental labor relation between humanity and nature. Humans 
are ecological members of the planetary system. Food is one of our most basic 
and necessary connections to the material world. Our continued existence relies 
on reconciling our metabolism with the planetary metabolism. This rational 
ecology is the stated end goal of the degrowth movement, albeit in other 
language. Revolutionary Marxist theory informs us how we can achieve that 
goal. Marxist political economy explains how the political and economic 
structures that emerge from this ecological foundation operate to create our 
current contradictions, and informs the social organization necessary for 
achieving non-alienated production. The Cuban food system represents our 
strongest empirical case of degrowth. Not coincidentally, it occurred in a 
country highly influenced by socialist thought, and in the agricultural sector. 
The following sections will trace the dialectically connected political, economic, 
and ecological conditions which led Cuba to develop its incredible 
agroecological system, and to deconstruct the remaining challenges that 
impede Cuba’s ability to carry the agroecological revolution and degrowth 
movement to completion.  
 
 
 
Evolving Modes of Production 
 
 The history of Cuba’s land is a landscape history of power and the means 
to which production in society is dedicated. The Cuban revolution has long been 
called “socialist”, “nationalist”, “peasant”, and more, in conflicting accounts of 
this complex and multi-tendency event. The Marxist influences underscored the 
political nature of social relations, production, and the ends to which society 
marshals its resources. The following material history describes the trajectory of 
agricultural industrialization and deindustrialization, evolving political conditions, 
and the subsequent rise of alternative organizational, technical, ecological, and 
potentially revolutionary forms of agricultural production. 
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Pre-Columbian (Pre-1492)  
 
 Cuba’s pre-Columbian inhabitants consisted of several hunter-gatherer 
and fishing cultures, the Guanahatabeyes, the Ciboneyes, and the Taino 
(Wright 2012). Hunter-gatherers lived in pre-class societies because the 
inability to preserve or overproduce resources prevented surplus from becoming 
a point of contention and the basis for oppression of one group by another 
(Engels 2010). Cuba’s organized agricultural history starts 1500 years ago with 
the production of indigenous species still present today, including maize, 
cassava, sweet potato, squash, beans, peanuts, guayaba, guanabana, and 
pineapple cultivated by settled farmers (Wright 2012). These farmers used 
practical forms of agroecology including polycultures, nitrogen fixing, and slash-
and-burn cultivation (Rosset 1994; Wright 2012). Though crops still have 
specific seasons, continuous year-round cultivation is possible in Cuba due to 
the tropical climate, which impacts the seasonality, productivity, and 
biodiversity of agriculture. The productivity of modern small-scale farmers and 
their consistent contribution to household food needs is bolstered by this 
ecological context. The remnants of indigenous practices that survived 
European colonization merged with the farming techniques of American 
migrants, African slaves, and European settlers to create a hybrid adapted to 
the natural conditions of the island at relatively low levels of technology. Today, 
this hybrid serves as the basis for “indigenous” Cuban knowledge (Funes et al. 
2002; Rosset 1994).  
 
Colonial (1492 - 1902) 
 
 Following the genocide of the indigenous population, land was rapidly 
redistributed to Spanish settlers in the form of sugarcane plantations and large-
scale cattle ranches (latifundios), which voraciously consumed local resources 
and imported slave labor (Wright 2012). Latifundium were the Roman rural 
slave estates which shaped patterns of agriculture across Europe and were 
accordingly exported to colonial holdings like Cuba, via the European powers 
(Haila and Levins 1992). Cuba’s colonization by Spain had two key 
characteristics: the first being Spain’s exportation of the latifundios model, and 
the second being Cuba’s role in facilitating the preconditions for 
industrialization, created by the consolidation and global expansion of 
commercial empires like Spain in the 16th century (Haila and Levins 1992). The 
resultant increase in the volumes of trade, and thus the significance of markets, 
combined with socio-political upheavals in Western European states, provided 
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the conditions for early industrialization. Bulk trade facilitated monoculture 
agriculture, revived for the first time since the Romans by the Portuguese in the 
15th century and rapidly exported to the West Indies (Haila and Levins 1992). 
Thus, the consolidation of world capitalism in the 1500’s led to rapid, but 
regionalized, changes in environment, and the slave-driven plantation 
economies pursued extensive destruction of Caribbean habitat for the sake of 
the world economy (Haila and Levins 1992). The local flora and fauna of the 
Neo-European colony ecologies were decimated by the species imported by 
colonizers and eventually modified beyond recognition (Haila and Levins 1992).  
 The colonial mode of production evolved from feudal export exploitation 
to capitalist export orientation. Capitalism enabled the displacement of local 
resources at a new level. African slave labor on pan-American plantations built 
the material wealth of the capitalist system. Up until the 1700’s, the majority of 
plantation labor consisted of African slaves, but following abolition, their labor 
was augmented by Mexican and Chinese workers. Post-slavery social relations 
of production crossed the whole range of rural classes described by Lenin in his 
Theses on the Agrarian Question. Each distinct laborer population brought new 
practices to the local agriculture based on their culture and knowledge of the 
agricultural process (Wright 2012). Class interests diverged early between 
latifundio owners who produced sugarcane for cash-export and “small and 
medium-scale crop-based systems and farmers” who produced the domestic 
food supply (Wright 2012). 
 Agroecologies remained relatively stable from the 1500’s - 1700’s. 
Differences were class and scale-based, rather than technological. Laborers 
were allowed to intercrop beans, peanuts, and other species in the sugarcane 
fields of medium to large-scale farms as partial payment for, and a means to 
minimize, activities like weeding (Funes et al. 2002). Intercropping contributed 
to the greater degree of biodiversity and domestic food production 
characteristic of early sugarcane years. The gap between growing methods of 
large and small-scale producers appeared in the 1800’s due to capital-facilitated 
consolidation and mechanization. Large scale, industrial, exchange-earning 
agriculture was perceived as modern and superior while domestic production 
and low-input methods were ideologically relegated to the realm of rural 
poverty. During this period, neither the exploitation of land nor labor could be 
characterized as sustainable, but the rate of degradation and the ability to 
temporarily fill labor and resource gaps makes this period relatively less crisis-
ridden than modern conditions. Metabolic rifts in production widened with the 
increasing export of crops and nutrients out of the island ecosystem. However, 
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metabolic rifts are not solely the result of improving technology, but also the 
underlying social organization of production in tandem.   
 
U.S. Imperialism (1902 - 1958)  
 
 The major defining feature of the Cuban political economy following 
independence from Spain was the weakness of class-based institutions 
(Tennant 2000). Cuba demonstrated little characteristic blatantly-antagonistic 
class relationships between national social groups. Bourgeois democracy was 
incredible weak. Tennant explores how “this peculiar characteristic not only 
sowed the seeds for the formation of Bonapartist-type regimes, both pre- and 
post-1959, but promoted the growth of a powerful official Communist Party 
which was willing to conclude opportunist agreements with various 
authoritarian political leaders in order to advance its own interests against 
those of both the national bourgeoisie and the working class” (2000). The social 
organization of production had, as always, profound impacts on the local 
political trajectory which would ultimately shape the Revolution of 1959. 
“Independent” Cuba was born as a “virtual appendage” to the US economy. 
The native bourgeoisie was fatally weakened by Spain’s “rule-or-ruin” policy. 
Cuba was already structured to be dominated by the Spanish Empire, and, 
following the costly war of independence, was left open US finance. American 
investors bought up the most developed sectors before a national economy or 
national capitalist class could consolidate (Tennant 2000). That no native 
capitalist class could crystalize would prevent a national bourgeoisie from 
establishing strong institutions to promote its own class rule and defend its 
national integrity from US imperialism. This situation highly resembled the 
conditions of Russia in the 1910’s (Tennant 2000). However, the working class 
in Cuba continued to  emerge thanks to US industrial development of the two 
main export sectors - tobacco and sugar (Tennant 2000). The weak 
development of class-based institutions served to increase political confusion. 
Was the revolution to be an anti-imperialist struggle? To put Cuba on an equal 
footing in the capitalist world market? To free the working class and the 
peasantry from the tyranny of capitalist exploitation? Who interests aligned and 
whose conflicted? To what degree could different political groupings work in 
unity and whose interests were simply too antagonistic? 
 U.S. imperialism reinforced the dominance of extractive industrial 
agriculture. The U.S. was the center of modern capitalism and the predominant 
military-imperialist power following World War II. De-facto control of state 
policy and a constant military presence in Cuba protected American investors’ 
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interests in agricultural, economic, and military sectors (Cisneros 2012). 
American monopolies dominated urban and rural spaces. The US held 90% of 
shares in the telephone and electric services, approximately 50% in public 
services, and about 40% in raw sugar (Taaffe 2000). A small group of US 
investors gained control of the main sugarcane plantations, 13 of which 
produced 70% of the country’s total sugar output (Wright 2012). Competition 
consolidated land ownership and reduced the previously 90,000 small diverse 
farms to just 38,130 small-scale operations exhibiting a variety of class 
characteristics (Funes et al. 2002) . Access to land for small-scale farms 
became increasingly precarious: tenancy, sub-tenancy, share-cropping, and 
“land administration” prevailed over full ownership rights as land was 
increasingly commodified (Funes et al. 2002; Wright 2012). Between the trade 
agreements and direct American control of their key enterprises, Cuba was 
compelled to concentrate on the sugar cash crop and continued to suffer a 
negative trade flow.  
 Additionally, 70% of Cuba’s food imports came from the United States, 
including products which could be favorably produced (Cisneros 2012). By 
1946, the preponderance of sugar, cattle, and rice production overshadowed 
extremely low records of vegetable production, while tilting dietary preferences 
towards heavy starches, high sugar contents, and meat consumption (Funes et 
al. 2002). American domination of national agriculture ended practices of 
intercropping and self-provisioning plots on plantations (Funes et al. 2002). A 
blind trust in the power of technology attempted to erase local ecologies and 
human-ecological relations. Traditional ecological knowledge persisted in the 
subsistence sector, made up predominately of campesinos, or peasants, who 
survived alongside high-output industrial agriculture by maximizing the 
productivity of small plots through low-input methods. Areas unsuitable for 
intensive monoculture techniques, such as highland agroforestry systems, also 
maintained alternative production methods (Funes et al. 2002). Production 
remained a “mix of semi-feudal remnants with capitalistic practices” (Funes et 
al. 2002). Haila and Levins (1992) notes how, ecologically, the pressures to 
increase productivity while reducing labor led to practices like the “burning of 
sugar cane before harvest [which] put so much ash into the Cuban atmosphere 
that it provoked increased rainfall just when this was least desirable because it 
interfered with the transport of cut cane to the mills”. Capitalist agriculture 
undermined the material and labor capacity for production in Cuba, as 
elsewhere, to serve American and British markets. Small-scale farming 
exhibited minimal chemical, mechanical, and irrigation usage, similar to 
methods modern alternative agriculturalists would re-adopt (Wright 2012). 
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These conditions of unresolved rural exploitation put land rights, fair land use, 
and food sovereignty issues at the forefront of revolutionary consciousness.  
 By 1958, over 200,000 Cuban families lacked access to land. 35% of the 
population suffered nutritional deficiencies while 4 million hectares on 
latifundios remained uncultivated (Funes et al. 2002; Wright 2012). Rural 
development was non-existent outside of the mechanization of the latinfundios. 
With sugarcane monoculture accounting for 75% of export earnings, the 
national economy felt every price fluctuation on the world market. Domestic 
food production was sidelined so as to allocate more land to sugarcane 
production. Sugar cane workers were either direct rural proletariat or peasants 
who owned/leased land with set contracts with the sugar mills (Martínez Alier 
1977).  Mirroring national trends, the cost of living continuously rose out of 
proportion with wages, which were artificially suppressed by the dictatorships 
on behalf of international investors (Cushion 2016). Production was notoriously 
inefficient under the quota system, which incentivized overproduction of sugar 
cane amongst farmers, who were then forced to destroy the leftover crop the 
sugar mills would not process after meeting the national quota (Martínez Alier 
1977). Conditions in the sugar industry inspired continuous labor organizing in 
the 1930’s - 1950’s which kept the country in constant unrest, and prevented 
any of the administrations from consolidating sufficient power (Cushion 2016). 
Dockworkers, rail workers, and farm workers showed great rank-and-file 
solidarity across the sugar industry which enabled local struggles to reach 
national scales (Cushion 2016). This organizing across both rural and urban 
proletarian spaces created the revolutionary conditions for 1959. But, despite 
their narrative role in the revolution, traditional farmers’ knowledge and 
lifestyles were not positively integrated into production until the extraordinary 
circumstances of the Special Period. 
 
The Cuban Revolution 
 
 Cuba’s historical trajectory is only coherent when considered in the 
context of its global relations. The “socialist” island is a product a “peculiar 
combination of circumstances” (Taaffe 2000) shaped by massive forces of 
colonialism and imperialism in close geographic proximity. The Cuban 
revolutionary leadership, dominated by Fidel Castro, adopted socialist ideologies 
to the extent that socialist demands inspired the Cuban masses to rise up 
against the escalating pressures from U.S. capitalism, and forced the leadership 
to embrace some principles, through not the democratic organizational 
foundations, of Marxism (Cushion 2016). These theoretical and organizational 
  
19 
gaps explain the tension between wide-spread welfare gains under the 
Revolutionary regime and the enduring lack of democracy. As Cuba once 
surpassed the limitations of capitalism by overthrowing the national system, so 
must a worker’s democracy organize today to surpass the limitations of the 
current bureaucracy.  
 Colonial and semi-colonial countries occupy a particular role. Their 
underdevelopment has a combined character - their “primitive” economic forms 
of labor organization are combined with the “last word” in capitalist technology 
and culture. As such, the political strivings of the proletariat in these countries 
are the struggle for the “most elementary achievements” of national 
independence and bourgeois democracy combined with the socialist struggle 
against world imperialism (Trotsky 1981). The capitalist democratic revolution 
breaks the feudal social form by distributing land to the peasants, securing 
national freedom from the stranglehold of foreign economic and political 
domination, and developing industry along modern lines (Taaffe 2000). The 
socialist revolution overthrows the tyranny of private property and class society. 
Therefore, the central tasks of the colonial world are the agrarian revolution or 
liquidation of feudal heritages, and national independence as the overthrow of 
the “imperialist yoke” (Trotsky 1981). But the lack of a revolutionary party with 
such an understanding has frustrated the development of the socialist 
revolution many times, including Cuba’s (Tennant 2000). 
 There is a crucial distinction between the political conditions for revolution 
and the economic preconditions for socialism. The correct perspectives and a 
revolutionary party can navigate their contradictions. Marxists do not pretend 
that it is possible to build socialism overnight in a country of poor and middle 
peasants, lacking independent economic unity in a predominantly pre-capitalist 
economy, and through a politically weak proletariat (Tennant 2000). But neither 
is the struggle to be considered in an isolated sense, against a world system 
like capitalism. Marxist internationalism draws together the colonies, which 
have no independent economic unity and are incapable of developing by 
themselves (thanks colonial exploitation) with the capitalist countries who, 
having leaped forward through the exploitation of the colonies, can, under 
socialism, turn back around and pull the underdeveloped countries up alongside 
them (Tennant 2000).  
 Cuba was classically underdeveloped, first by Spanish colonialists, then 
American imperialists, for the exploitation of its raw agricultural materials. 
Trade under both feudal and capitalist systems comes at the cost of exploiting 
some group, somewhere. Exchange can occur which does not exploit either 
labor or the environment. With layered local, regional, and global planning, 
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multi-scalar exchange of labor and resources can be reciprocal and part of a 
rationally planned human-ecological system. However, under the short sighted 
profit motive of capitalism, Cuba was unable to sustain such exploitive levels of 
production for global investors, much less meet the needs of its workers and 
environment. This contradiction gave rise to constant rural and urban unrest.  
 Che Guevara and Fidel Castro led an armed insurrection from the 
countryside that was tied to the widespread discontent against capitalist 
exploitation. Yet the sustained organizing of the urban and rural proletariat in 
the prior decades set the conditions in which a 200-strong guerrilla force could 
tip the scales against the US-backed dictatorship. In turn, the politically 
ambiguous grouping of the 26 of July Movement (M26J) led to the authoritarian 
tendencies of the Revolutionary regime once in power. Both the M26J and the 
main communist party, the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), called for a broad 
alliance to include the “progressive national bourgeoisie” element in the anti-
imperialist patriotic and democratic revolution. But Cuban capitalists were cross-
invested in land, and the big landowners in industry. The movement could not 
push through serious land reform with the support of the Cuban capitalists. Nor 
were the national bourgeois capable of leading a struggle against US 
imperialism when it was propping up their position against the Cuban masses 
(Taaffe 2000). The “utter bankruptcy” of Cuban capitalism could not find a way 
out of the “impasse” of society, but neither could they ignore the “colossal 
pressure of an aroused peasantry and the working class” (Taaffe 2000). 
 This balance of social forces continues to affect the governance and 
development of Cuba today. Both of the organizations which fought for 
leadership of the revolution, the PSP and the M26J, attempted to combine 
antagonistic classes into a single anti-imperialist struggle. Neither the initial 
revolution, nor the eventual state, were based on the organized leadership of 
the working class, as called for by Marx’s scientific socialism. Up until 1960, 
41.6% of Cuba’s population was still rural (Group 2017), split between Cuba’s 
traditional peasantry- campesinos- and farm laborers. Both struggled greatly 
under the imperialist economy and, as demonstrated in the Russian Revolution, 
had the opportunity to organize and take power on an independent basis (Lenin 
1951). However, the popular front approach of the main Communist Party 
(PSP) consistently subordinated the power of the working class to the limited 
program of the petty bourgeois leadership. After nearly a decade, during which 
the official Communist Party had led organized labor into uncritical multi-class 
blocs (effectively stripping the working class of an independent class voice), any 
sort of radical program from either the working class or petit-bourgeois anti-
imperialist groups had all but vanished (Tennant 2000). Similarly, the M26J was 
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a broad and conflicting coalition of forces, all seeking solutions for the 
accumulated problems of an incomplete capitalist democratic revolution, but 
too diverse to explicitly reject capitalism in fear of alienating portions of its 
base.  
 Courageous decades of organizing amongst workers prevented the rolling 
dictatorships from consolidating sufficient power to stabilize the country at a 
rate of exploitation deemed desirable amongst the international bourgeoisie, in 
this time of global financial downturn. The revolution would not have been 
possible without the resistance of the working masses, yet the Cuban revolution 
must not be falsely characterized as a worker’s revolution. The 26 of July 
Movement which came to power had little ideological coherency, and none of 
the leaders explicitly ascribed to Marxism. Guevara himself stated in October of 
1960, "The principal actors of this revolution have no coherent viewpoint” 
(Guevara 1960). The Revolution specifically lacked a consciously worked-out 
programme of demands and tactics which enables the working class to coalesce 
and lead the transition to a system of worker’s control and management, which 
defines socialism in the classical scientific-Marxist sense. Cuban revolutionary 
Carlos Franqui described the early situation: "Instead of a new society created 
from below by the workers, Cuba would be a society in which the workers were 
a productive force obedient to the dictates of those in power. The prime 
movers of this new society would be Fidel, ten comandantes, and the members 
of the old Communist party.” (Franqui 1984). The masses had no control of the 
state machine (Franqui 1984). The officially-mandated Cuban Communist Party 
(CCP), in line with the traditions of Stalinism, took efforts to prevent the 
working class from organizing independently from both the national bourgeois 
and the anti-imperialist capitalists. Understanding Cuba accurately as a populist 
bureaucracy, rather than a democratic worker’s state, allows us to understand 
the power and production conditions under which grassroots movements and 
institutional regulations emerged.   
 Cuba’s meandering policy direction through the late 20th century exhibits 
precisely how “without conscious democratic control by the working class, mass 
discussion, a testing and retesting of plans with the necessary corrections 
added, even the greatest geniuses in a planned economy will inevitably make 
the grossest blunders” (Taaffe 2000). Cuba’s food and agricultural policies 
highlight this trend. Unprecedented or even typical agricultural crises can 
emerge in a system where politicians drive technical agricultural decisions 
without farmer’s technical expertise. The current government repeatedly 
annexed representative worker’s organizations in an attempt to simultaneously 
legitimize its “socialist” nature and stifle dissent. One worker described 
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management as a “yo-yo system” in nationalized industries, where requests 
were sent upwards and decisions sent back down (Tennant 2000). 
Plebiscitarian politics created the image of participatory democracy, while 
repression ensured that no legitimate opposition to Castro’s interpretation of la 
patria and socialism would emerge (Tennant 2000). The working class retained 
little control over the political economy while Castro “opportunistically 
manipulated the weakness of independent class-based organisations to 
strengthen his own position as the unchallengeable Maximum Leader” (Tennant 
2000).  
 Therefore, when the regime faced a crucial discussion about the direction 
and methods of the planned economy in 1960, it occurred within the context of 
maintaining public unity around Castro. The “Great Debate” attempted to figure 
out the structure of planning and the role of incentives in Cuba’s “socialist” 
economy – specifically to increase production rates and provide higher quality 
of life through increased access and consumption. Cuba needed to increase 
production to provide quality living standards for the long-exploited Cuban 
people. However, similar to the USSR, production increases were seen as 
desirable in of themselves, rather than to fulfill a specific social goal. 
Additionally, the challenge was Cuba’s status as a semi-colonial country heavily 
dependent on a single agricultural product and one major market with no 
supporting international revolution. On one side, the self-finance planning 
model proposed capitalist forms of competition between state-owned 
companies to determine production, investment and distribution. On the 
opposing side, the budgetary finance system denied any notion of a market 
existing between companies. Monetary transactions between enterprises would 
be replaced by a central ministry would allocated all revenues according to the 
conscious priorities of decision makers. The former system intended to use 
material incentives amongst workers to simulate production while the later 
advocated moral incentives in line with Guevara’s New Man ideas. The New 
Man concept of workers as a subjective, voluntarist lever to overcome uneven 
economic development reached closer to the heart of Cuba’s contradicting 
social organization, but because Guevara avoided any criticism of the 
revolutionary process as a whole, he failed to draw the link between the 
strategy and method of the insurrection to the lack of proletarian democracy 
and its associated productive advantages (Tennant 2000). 
 Dissent was increasingly suppressed the more autonomous political 
thought and organizations were stifled. The future incorporation of 
organizations and movements, or the creations of Ministries and their 
bureaucratic apparatus, would serve to integrate and deflect the power 
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represented in this autonomous organizing rather than the empowerment of 
direct democracy. The grassroots urban agriculture and agroecology 
movements have been institutionalized in the same manner as Castro used to 
channel mass revolutionary energy into formal but relatively powerless 
structures.  
 Workers’ direct democratic control is exercised through layers of 
leadership elected up through workplace and community committees (soviets). 
Autonomous workers’ and peasants’ organization did exist in Cuba prior to the 
revolution. However they were not the vehicle through which state power was 
taken. These organizations were insufficiently dense, often misled by the PSP or 
other leadership’s inaccurate political perspectives, and actively disassembled 
by both the Batista and Castro regimes (Cushion 2016). Their heroic efforts 
ripened the conditions for the anti-imperialist struggle in Cuba, but they were 
unable to be the means through which the working class overthrew the 
dictatorship to take over the running of society themselves. Without this 
organizational foundation, and the democratic training & leadership that 
participation in autonomous worker’s organizations like soviets builds, Castro 
and the revolutionary leaders slid into bureaucracy.  
 Without mass leadership, every revolution risks descent into bureaucracy. 
The existing “Communist” party (PSP) exhibited Stalinist tendencies including 
adherence to the misconceived “Two Stages Theory”, that a socialist revolution 
can only occur following a national capitalist revolution (Trotsky 2010). This 
theory, created to justify the abandonment of the international worker’s 
revolution by Stalinist Russia, combined with the remnants of Cuba’s state 
machine to solidify a top-down welfare-oriented state rather than a bottom-up 
democratic one (Taaffe 2000). Historian Maurice Zeitlin describes how “at 
present, despite the apparently ample participation of the workers in 
discussions and decisions concerning the implementation of the objectives of 
the national economic plan set for their plant, the workers have no role 
whatsoever, to my knowledge, in determining the plan itself” (Taaffe 2000). 
Over time, grassroots adaptations would be diffused the bureaucracy when 
they grew sufficiently widespread, instead of the workers initiating and 
controlling institutional change to further collectively-decided pursuits.  
 There were organizations on the ground that challenged the same 
revolutionary mistakes made by the PSP and the M26J. The Bolshevik-Leninist 
Party (PBL) split from the PSP to maintain a consistent position on the 
democratic class-based nature necessary to the revolution. The PBL maintained 
the position that the task of national liberation could only be achieved via the 
dictatorship of the proletariat with the support of the peasant masses and so 
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advanced an agrarian programme to forge that alliance: the “nationalisation 
without compensation of the lands, buildings, machinery and livestock of the 
capitalist owners, and their distribution amongst the rural poor, support for the 
cooperative union of peasants in order to increase agrarian production 
scientifically, the carrying out of a vast building programme of hygienic housing 
for peasant communities, reduction in the length of the working day, free 
health care, and the creation of rural schools and the implementation of 
compulsory education” (Tennant 2000). The PBL demonstrated that the 
intervention of Stalinism into Cuban affairs through the PSP introduced a new 
counter-revolutionary factor into the working class movement and that the 
“immediate insurrectionary perspective” favored by the M26J and many small 
groups was an exhausted technique which left the oppressed people 
unprepared and vulnerable (Tennant 2000). The PBL explicitly recognized the 
central task to be the “conquest of the masses through the development of an 
action programme which combined a struggle to liquidate the remnants of 
feudalism in the countryside (the agrarian revolution) with a struggle to 
overthrow imperialist domination (national independence), under the leadership 
of the proletariat” (Tennant 2000). 
 The trouble that arises from an insufficiently organized working class is 
that “without the conscious control and management by the masses 
themselves, the development of a new elite is inevitable” (Taaffe 2000). On top 
of that, a worker’s revolution faces inexorable bureaucratic degeneration so 
long as the revolution is globally isolated. For countries like Cuba who have 
been deliberately underdeveloped, their long-term survival as a worker’s 
democracy is dependent on the collaborative efforts of socialists and socialist 
countries around the world in removing, for good, the reactionary threat of 
capitalism and to cooperate in production, distribution, and consumption as we 
begin to rebuild society. But as long as the control of production remains in the 
hands of the bureaucratic elite, that elite will eventually become “an absolute 
fetter on the further development of society” (Taaffe 2009). The capitalist 
economy squanders massive potential, its established investments in 
knowledge, infrastructure, and the existing system functioning as a ball-and-
chain against changing societal needs. The owners of the means of production 
will not yield and change the methods of production until the profitability of a 
new system would be greater than the accumulation of both short-term 
earnings of the existing system plus the cost of restructuring. A central 
bureaucracy can make up some of that ground by pursuing a planned economy 
with social priorities, but the bureaucratic element is still far less effective than 
a worker’s democracy, as the bureaucratic elite cannot let a true meritocracy 
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threaten their status nor the reproduction of the system that keeps their class 
in power. This factor would come into play in the centralized agricultural system 
in the 70’s and 80’s, when the seemingly progressive role of the state in 
developing industry - by adopting the agricultural techniques of the advanced 
countries (Taaffe 2000) - plateaued, then collapsed. 
 The analysis of the politics of the Cuban Revolution illuminates the role of 
democracy in socialism. The detailed breakdown of ideological tendencies and 
the “ruling ideas” which rose to power explains the course of the economic 
transformation of society. Clarification of one of the central contradictions of 
the Cuban system – the relatively high social welfare accomplishments  
achieved under a repressive bureaucracy – stem from the class nature of the 
revolution. The success of Cuban agriculture under the planned economy, and 
the weaknesses that now threaten it, can be explained and resolved by the 
reemergence of a democratic movement.   
 
Post Revolution (1959 - 1989 ; 1989 - Present) 
 
 Cuba’s circumstances following the revolution and following the Special 
Period exemplify both sides of the degrowth process. Despite early attempts to 
decentralize and diversify food production, Cuba experienced a catastrophic 
unplanned transition out of industrialized agriculture due to economic and 
ecological crises. The “means of production” discussed in the following sections 
references not just classic industry but the material means from which 
humanity derives life from the broader environment, including the role of 
agriculture, food access, and land rights in the socialist struggle. Because it was 
not possible to expropriate land from the landowning class without coming into 
conflict with capitalist property relations, Cuba ultimately nationalized all 
foreign-owned assets in cascading response to the heavy-handed imperialist 
tactics of the Eisenhower administration.  
 The new government implemented the First Agrarian Reform Law in 
1960 to dismantle the latinfundios. Foreigners and Batista-supporters were not 
compensated during nationalization, and American investors were specifically 
barred from land ownership (Wright 2012). The Second Agrarian Reform Law 
followed four years later, reversing the early distribution of land and creating 
the centralized agriculture system (Wright 2012). As Lenin describes in the 
Agrarian Question, the socialist state, even one based in democratic worker’s 
organizations, can lack the labor and industrial capacity to move immediately to 
centralized agriculture, especially in such underdeveloped contexts as Russia 
and Cuba. Such abrupt policy reversals remain typical of the Cuban bureaucracy 
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as it attempts to balance the revolutionary expectations of the masses with 
retaining the bureaucracy’s class power. Similarly, future productivity difficulties 
would be tied to the undemocratic birth of the state farms and other 
enterprises which prevented worker control and undermined collective 
motivation.  
 Though the Cuban Revolution did not succeed in establishing a worker’s 
state, it did establish a planned economy. Cuban agriculture had to delicately 
balance production priorities under the conditions of the embargo. The heritage 
of the official Cuban Communist Party heavily impacted the perspectives and 
the practical relations between the “socialist” countries of the world. Favorable 
trade benefits through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
quickly outweighed the priority of domestic diversification. One reason a 
successful workers revolution must be international is because the collaboration 
between countries at different points of development supports and expands the 
capabilities of all, when they are orientated towards socially-determined 
production. The lack of successful worker’s states taking power in the 
developed industrial countries like Germany was one of the primary factors 
leading to the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union (Collins 1987). 
Exchange can bolster local resource access and community resilience when 
trade is based on product utility, but not within the profit context of global 
capitalism. Thus the potential for international support via collaborative 
production between the member states of COMECON was undermined by 
remaining profit-motive, both internally and externally. Similarly, the 
undialectical emphasis on maximizing resource intensive development, as in the 
U.S.S.R, was reinforced in Cuba through the PCC and trade practices.  
 The United States cancelled Cuba’s sugar quota as one of their first 
retaliatory actions against the Revolution. This economic blow might have 
forced Cuba to turn inwards and diversify for domestic production but for the 
U.S.S.R.’s willingness to trade sugar and citrus fruits for cereals and other food 
products (Rosset 1994). Chemical and mechanical inputs, oil, manufactured 
goods, and technical “expertise” available through COMECON dangerously 
prolonged Cuba’s dependence on industrial export monoculture. Cuba’s efforts 
to achieve food sovereignty were continuously undercut by these favorable 
terms of trade; by the 1980’s only 40% of cultivated land produced for 
domestic needs (Burchardt 2000). Following the economic crash in 1989, as 
much as 55% of the calories, 50% of the proteins, and 90% of the fats 
consumed in Cuba were imports (Burchardt 2000; Premat 2003). 
Despite this weakness in practice, Premat (2003) argues that national 
food security was “explicitly central to the government’s project” through 
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“management of agricultural land and production” and “equitable distribution of 
basic food products, national or imported, at affordable prices through the 
rationing system.” Food access, restricted by the cost of living on one side and 
wage issues on the other, was one primary condition for urban and rural unrest 
in the decades leading up to the revolution (Cushion 2016). The new 
government had to resolve these issues if it were to stay in power for any 
length of time. Despite its flaws, the ration “more than any other Cuban 
institution instilled in citizens the notion of national food equity while recreating 
the state as its guarantor” (Díaz Vázquez 2000; Premat 1998).  
The ecological contradictions of resource-intensive agriculture are 
internalized under socialism where it is externalized under capitalism (Haila and 
Levins 1992). By the 1980’s the ecological, economic, and international political 
conditions began to show the strain. Though incomplete, widespread Marxist 
paradigms made Cuban workers, researchers, and ministries a more receptive 
place for emerging agroecology arguments about the wholeness, dynamic 
interconnection, and complexity of agricultural production (Haila and Levins 
1992). Such groups recognized several overlapping factors: 1) that science is a 
social product which requires a critical outlook at what world science 
proclaimed as “modern”, 2) there was a new balance to be struck between 
declining export earnings and rising  import costs, and 3) that agriculture plays 
a predominant role in the Cuban economy (Haila and Levins 1992). The 
potential for agroecology was present thanks to conditions prior to 1989 and, 
through the crisis, exploded into use. Agroecology’s presence in Cuba is a 
dialectical development. 
The colloquially known “Third Agrarian Reform” that established the 
Basic Cooperative Production Units (UBPCs) in 1993 radically re-allocated land 
and production responsibilities (Febles-González et al. 2011). The UBPC law 
gave state land in permanent free usufruct to individuals or collectives for 
cultivation, extended credit and resources to collectives, and claimed to 
delegate management and decision-making to the workers (Febles-González et 
al. 2011). Most state farms, including sugar plantations, were converted to 
UBPCs. In the broader economic context, Castro, was applying what he 
considered the lessons of Lenin’s New Economic Policy, developed for similar 
conditions of isolated crisis, by opening up the economy to foreign investment, 
foreign ownership of sections of the economy, and circulation of US dollars. The 
regime included measures to defend healthcare and education, but massive lay-
offs of workers still resulted, and measures have been insufficient to prevent 
the return of some of the worst aspects of life under capitalism (Taaffe 2000). 
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The majority of industry remains in the hands of the state, but capitalism is 
seeping in through the pores of the crisis-induced black market.  
The organizational shift in agriculture coincided with severe shortages of 
oil, parts, and inputs (Febles-González et al. 2011). Nonetheless, by 2000 
cooperatives were responsible for cultivating 61.3% of agricultural land (Febles-
González et al. 2011). The state declared the greater crime to be for land to 
“go unused or be degraded without producing, while thousands of farm families 
who do not possess a single hectare of land are poor and hungry” (Febles-
González et al. 2011). The state hoped to avoid an exodus of rural families to 
faltering urban centers by attracting people to agriculture that was “perfected, 
humanized, made more productive”, and materially and socially acknowledge 
the work of agriculturalists, both rural and urban (Febles-González et al. 2011). 
Significant numbers had already migrated into the city to pick up wage-paying 
jobs but maintained extensive family ties to the campesino world. Thus, when 
the Special Period crisis hit, there were partial dual structures for food 
production already in action and, significantly, the cultural and scientific 
knowledge among city dwellers with campesino backgrounds necessary for 
transplanting, expanding, and creating new productive structures in urban 
settings. Those new productive structures included the expansion of traditional 
practices such as the patio, the transplanting of substance production into 
underutilized urban spaces, and the creation of entirely new methods including 
organiponicos and formal agroecology. By 1996 private farmers and 
campesinos already accounted for 70.7% of sales, state enterprises 25.7%, 
CPA’s 1.9%, and UBPC’s 1.7%. These production numbers, however, fail to 
include autoconsumo (self-provisioning) that occurred in small holdings because 
they were “officially thought to be insignificant” (Buchmann 2009).   
 
Cuba’s Specialty: Urban Agriculture 
 
 Current food production in Cuba does not adhere cleanly to the variety 
of existing labels for alternative agriculture because it is a mad mix of feudal, 
capitalist, state authoritarian, and emergent socialist forms. Cuba’s intriguing 
alternative agriculture is reviving knowledge developed under old forms of 
social organization, predominately indigenous and campesino culture, and 
applying to it contemporary scientific methodologies and ideals. Each venture 
varies in degree of radical implementation: from agroecology, urban and peri-
urban agriculture (UPA), subsistence production, low-input production, to 
commercial, export, and industrial agriculture. Household-level urban food 
production especially occurs on complex spectrums of effort, methods, 
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knowledge, and formality that are poorly captured in either English or Spanish 
terminology, as, thus far, an explicitly historical materialist analysis has yet to 
be applied to Cuba’s agriculture.  
For 30 years Cuba was the only country in Latin America to have 
eliminated hunger through the purchase of foreign food with export income 
(Rosset 1994). Imported food is distributed through the ration and state-owned 
stores. Currently, ration quantities last 7-10 days out of the month, and 
remaining food needs are met at significant cost to households (Mesa-Lago 
2009). The non-ration food system is complex and only partially encompassed 
by state policy and institutions. Intensive UPA originated as an emergency 
adaptation, but Cuba has an enduring tradition of autoconsumo and is 
climatically advantageous for this practice. Private markets, import stores, and 
restaurants are of limited access to the general population because of their 
relatively high prices. (Funes et al. 2002). Ironically, this situation improves 
Cuba’s relative access to local organic produce compared to similar incomes in 
capitalist countries. Though Cubans spend more total income on food, fresh 
local produce is cheaper than packaged, processed, and chemically-treated 
foods as taxed by the effects of the embargo on import prices. State farmer’s 
markets supply fresh produce, at well-subsidized prices, to augment the 
staples, such as rice, beans, and sugar, provided through the ration. Private 
supply-and-demand farmer’s markets can be expensive, but supermarkets carry 
little produce. In Cuba, almost all of the subsidies, direct and indirect, that 
effect food production in capitalist countries are reversed. Local produce is 
cheaper than imported. Processed foods are more expensive than fresh 
ingredients. This reversal of practices challenges notions of “natural” and 
“innate” societal patterns. Subsidizing corporate agriculture is as political a 
decision as creating revolutionary socially-driven production. Enduring 
institutions of the planned economy, including the food ration, nationalized 
health-care, public education, and land redistribution have supported people 
through the challenging circumstances and been part of the recovery towards a 
dignified quality of life. 
Current production methods are a perfect example of combined and 
uneven development. Cuba massively expanded industrial agricultural 
techniques using the concentrated power of the planned economy, but has 
subsequently revived traditional and developed agroecological methods due the 
changes in the material conditions of production, following the collapse of the 
U.S.S.R. Studying such informal and illegible cultivation is valuable for degrowth 
theory because it represents the seeds of the next (agricultural) revolution 
within the bounds of the current crisis-ridden system. Autoconsumo is 
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employed across Latin America as a remnant of past modes of small-scale and 
peasant production, but new science and social organizations evolving through 
practices like autoconsumo contain great potential for a revolutionary food 
system. 
 The term autoconsumo, or self-provisioning, refers to any form of food 
production that contributes to household consumption outside of formal 
channels. In Cuba, autoconsumo occurs in contrast to formal state food 
structures, such as the ration and import stores, private food sales, or 
institutionalized urban agriculture, most often represented by the organipónico. 
Autoconsumo can also include farming for employment, in which a private 
farmer cultivates for their family needs, fulfills a state quota, and is permitted 
to sell the surplus privately. Self-provisioning occurs in urban contexts primarily 
through the patio, or backyard, and in peri-urban and rural contexts through 
campesinos and their vegas or fincas, as farm plots are known. The soft 
boundaries between perceptions of active cultivation and “farming” are a 
distinct conception of production in comparison to those reinforced by 
capitalism. Production directly secures people’s own continuation, but functions 
as part and parcel of the daily routine, whether a household cultivates its whole 
diet or just supplementary portions. There is a casual normalization to directly 
securing your own material needs through autoconsumo that challenges the 
alienated conceptions of “work” and “living” artificially separated under 
capitalism. UPA similarly challenges the alienation between town and country 
by re-involving the urban working class in highly space- and nutrient-effective 
cultivation, challenges inherited conceptions of scale and spatiality that assume 
agriculture as rural and extensive, and brings to the forefront questions of 
worker-driven versus institutionally-driven production.  
Today, Cubans perceive food products as having distinct spatialities 
(Bayler 2017). Those spatialities correlate with different scales and social 
organizations of production. Import stores, ration stores, state produce 
markets, private produce markets, and self-provisioning plots provide different 
types of food. Differences in supply are based on the productive needs of the 
crop balanced against the capabilities of existing (but diminished) production 
systems and the resources allocated to specified production as prioritized by 
centralized planning. Spatiality and capability are linked through the ecological, 
geographic, and climatic composition of Cuba. Food needs that can be met 
through local production are met in that space, while products that require 
extensive space, infrastructure, or other resources beyond local capacity are 
obtained through state production or imports. However, the causal relationship 
of crop production to local capacity is actually reversed when viewed in the 
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longer chronological context. The main of food production and distribution 
(meat, grains, beans, fresh produce, dairy, processed foods) prior to the Special 
Period occurred through state agricultural and import systems. When the 
capacity of these systems fell, in tandem with the USSR, people were forced to 
expand local production capacity, individually or collectively, to fill in the gaps. 
Urban and suburban areas produce fruit and medicinals that are 
consumed usually within the neighborhood or borough. Peri-urban regions 
produce vegetables, roots and tubers, fresh pork, and fruit that is available 
through private sales or relational network exchanges. Food flows between 
provinces, either via family networks or centralized state markets, provide bulk 
vegetables, roots and tubers, and coffee, usually at greater quantity than 
private sources, but of less variety and lower quality. Nationally sourced 
products are honey, sugar, coffee, and milk. International imports supply the 
bulk of flour, chicken, milk, rice, processed foods, and ground coffee (Bayler 
2017).  
The Cuban state continues to distribute staples through imports and the 
ration network. The ration provides set quantities of rice, beans, cooking oil, 
sugar, matches, and other items needed and easier produced in bulk. State 
markets provide bananas, plantains, yucca, boniato, malanga, potatoes, bush 
beans, okra, and other fresh produce in open quantities at well-subsidized 
prices. Autoconsumo supplements high calorie foods with nutrient-rich ones. 
Space restrictions are offset by the productivity of tropical climates and space-
effective tree crops. Autoconsumo production focuses on varieties of fruit such 
as avocado, bananas, plantains, mango, mamell, guava, guanabana, pineapple, 
papaya, and chirimoya. Less frequently producers invest the extra time and 
labor necessary to cultivate vegetables such as green onion, chard, bush bean, 
lettuce, radish, cabbage, tomato, spinach, okra, caballero bean, garlic, onion, 
ají pepper, cucumber, and squash.  
This spatial allocation of production responsibilities is promising for 
resilience and degrowth planning. However, this spatiality was a mostly 
unintended consequence, not the intention, of state agricultural policy. The 
food and financial crises during the 1990’s increased demand on, but decreased 
the ability of, the state to import all necessary quantities and varieties of food 
products. The state focused their purchasing on staples such as rice, milk, and 
flour to maximize caloric delivery and simplify the logistics of distribution under 
deindustrialization. Overt and hidden hunger forced most people to revive 
small-scale production as UPA and autoconsumo. Cuba’s tropical climate, year-
round growing season, relatively recent campesino migrations, and continuing 
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cultivation of indigenous crops facilitated the expansion of household-level food 
production. 
Autoconsumo urban and peri-urban production is the adaptive legacy of 
the intensive and formalized UPA of the Special Period, combined with the prior 
campesino mode of production. As economic conditions improve, and the 
overwhelming pressure to produce one’s own food fades, urban food 
production maintains its presence in more informal, illegible, and less laborious 
forms. Initial UPA adaptation reconciled two challenges - food shortages and 
economic depression. People exchanged available labor and time for food 
through the medium of agricultural labor. With insufficient food available 
through state structures, and no other existing formal food networks, people 
turned to intensive cultivation at individual and communal levels. Traditional 
low-key patio fruit and tree-crop production exploded in suburban and rural 
zones (Bayler 2017). The balance between production intensity and 
consumption needs has shifted with economic recovery and policy changes 
formalizing alternative mechanisms. However, UPA as autoconsumo has taken 
new forms, rather than outright disappeared. It has remained highly adaptable 
and enduring in different conditions across Latin America. Cuban autoconsumo 
is subject to different pressures than formalized UPA. Cuban urban farms and 
organipónicos are facing free-market threats through price competition, real-
estate and agricultural land-grabbing, and tourism-orientation (Altieri 2016; 
Wright and Morris 2015). Autoconsumo, in turn, is influenced by macro-level 
influences that reach households directly, such as food import prices and 
availability, job and cash-income availability, and changes to state land and 
ration policies (Bayler 2017). 
The mass mobilization of campesinos, their labor, and their knowledge 
facilitated the revival of low-input, traditional, climatically-appropriate 
agricultural methods. This movement, rather than attempting to change formal 
institutions, expanded a dual food network that flows through communal ties 
and emerging private-sale mechanisms. This occurred because the state food 
network was so incapacitated by the economic crisis that there simply were not 
the means to supply the necessary food. The dual state/communal networks 
overlap partially in providing fundamental, but space-effective, crops such as 
roots, tubers, and beans. The state recognized, institutionalized, and legitimized 
aspects of campesino production and UPA, particularly in scientific and training 
programs, such as animal traction (Funes et al. 2002). Certain forms of urban 
food production were integrated into political policy, such as organipónicos or 
pig-raising, due to their more visible impacts across larger urban populations 
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and spaces. Autoconsumo as household-level production continues to be 
overlooked by the state and researchers alike. 
The material conditions of the Special Period forced the state to 
reorganize and reorientate. The state made concessions to support grassroots 
adaptations including redistributing the means of agricultural production - land, 
seeds, and tools - to the people willing to work them, through collective or 
usufruct rights. Additionally, people enacted these adaptations through the 
means of production which they already owned - most popularly the patio or 
backyard garden. Cuba saw the rise of dual structures through non-state 
organization of production in the agricultural, rather than industrial, sector. The 
dual structures represented by urban and peri-urban agriculture function 
predominately through family and community relations/social ties and produce 
for household-level sustenance. The geographic contraction necessitated by the 
energy descent of the Special Period forced the local organization (due to 
mobility limits) of the greatest point of need for day-to day-survival (food). The 
scale and means of production vary in terms of social organization, from family 
practice to formal employment, as well as in the extent of adoption of 
agroecological practices. However, UPA cannot be characterized as a grassroots 
democratic development in the role of soviets due to the lesser extent that they 
represent organization of power. 
That these dual structures occurred in agriculture, rather than industry, 
is key, because the social weight of subsistence production affects the degree 
to which dual food production structures represent an organized challenge to 
existing power structures. The urban food production movement, by acting and 
framing itself as a parallel, yet complementary, food network, enables people to 
participate without overtly challenging existing balances of power. Parallel 
structures have the potential to challenge formal structures. They have the 
potential to represent power. Russian soviets came to power in the government 
without bloodshed in October 1917 because they already ran the practical 
functioning of society (Collins 1987).  
 Yet the Cuban state is well aware of the role of autonomous democratic 
organizations. The Cuban state legalized black markets during the Special 
Period as one mechanism of relieving shortages. The state incorporates UPA 
and agroecology into formal institutions so that its expansion can complement, 
not challenge, state power. Capitalism similarly incorporates movements and 
ideas that arise from its internal contradictions. However, in both cases the 
system remains limited in its ability to facilitate the necessary change such 
groundswell represents. The ways in which the state choses to interact with 
alternative agricultures shows the tension between acknowledging the Cuban 
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state’s limitations in meeting people’s material needs, allowing people to fulfill 
their basic needs via alternative mechanisms, and opening the country to 
capitalism piece by piece while retaining the narrative of “socialist” Cuba. Class 
contradictions are highlighted when the regime reconsiders the privatization of 
land before targeting the stifling bureaucracy.  
 Autoconsumo practice uniquely crosses class lines from the urban 
working class to the rural proletariat and small and medium peasantry. The 
social classes who employ autoconsumo are indeed those who Lenin (1951) 
identifies can organize around the soviets and working class in a worker’s 
revolution. But, as of currently, autoconsumo production is a potential that is 
fading in power and necessity 20 years after the Special Period, rather than 
taking increased control over practical food production. This does not preclude 
the dual food system’s potential future role in such a transition. The improved 
methodological practices maintained and expanded through agroecology is 
ground, once gained, that need not be lost. That knowledge can be applied to 
different organizational forms of production beyond its current campesino ties. 
Centralization of planning does not preclude the potential of small scale and 
household production to improve ecological resilience in a socialist planned 
economy. Dual structures act as a training ground for new systems and an 
active challenge to existing ones. Cuban UPA has developed necessary scientific 
foundations of resilient food production practices. If additional forms of social 
organization pick up these methods and apply them through a democratic 
decentralized planned economy, it would be a quite literally revolutionary new 
food system.  
 The world capitalist class is preparing for the moment when it expects the 
planned economy to be liquidated. Countries are maneuvering for investment 
and market advantages, while American industries and Wall Street are 
clamoring for Congress to end the embargo. Foreign companies are buying up 
Cuban assets because they clearly recognize that “engagement” with Cuba is 
the best way to undermine the isolated planned economy and “socialist” state. 
Castro presents pro-capitalist measures as temporary policies to save socialism. 
However ideology cannot be maintained indefinitely without the material base. 
 Cuba has reached a fork in the road. The processes of capitalist 
restoration will accelerate if the Castro government continues its present 
policies. Cuba can neither maintain its current degrowth achievements nor 
expand them under its current political-economic system. Capitalism cannot 
permit such a threat. The current scenario can be diverted, but only through 
the establishment of a genuine regime of workers’ democracy linked to the task 
of carrying the socialist revolution to Latin America and the world. Such a path 
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could be taken through the establishment of genuine workers’ councils, locally 
and nationally, with control and management of the economy as a whole. 
Representatives and officials must be elected, subject to recall by their 
constituents, and receive only the average wage of a skilled worker. The one-
party regime is predominately justified by the threat to the revolution 
represented by imperialism and reactionary right-wing forces - a genuine 
threat, but one which cannot be averted by the sole organization of the party of 
the bureaucracy. All parties opposed to imperialism and fighting for the socialist 
planned economy should be allowed to organize, conduct propaganda, and 
stand candidates in elections (Taaffe 2000).  
 
 
 
Lessons for Degrowth 
 
Ecological irrationality is less built into socialist relations than inherited. If that is 
the case, it should be easier to win environmentalist battles in a socialist 
context. (Haila and Levins 1992) 
 
 Cuba is Levin’s (1991) “practical example” actively exploring what it 
means to create and participate in alternative agricultures. Degrowth seeks to 
bring the social metabolism back inside planetary boundaries. This broadly 
requires reducing consumption by emphasizing use over exchange values, 
changing production practices including decision-making, repairing intertwined 
social and environmental damages, seeking justice for the oppressed masses, 
and building new democratic decision-making mechanisms that empower all of 
us who live on this planet. Degrowth looks to Cuba as the best living example 
of a revolutionary new system. Cuba has a complicated past with Marxist ideas, 
yet its successes thus far are fundamentally tied to the ideas of worker’s 
democracy. Therefore, deeply understanding the Cuban case can guide our 
current efforts across the rest of the planet. 
Analysis reveals that Cuba’s greatest weakness and best solution is one 
in the same - worker’s democracy. Below I will explore how the degrowth 
project is the socialist project, through the key elements of resource 
nationalization, centralized planning with decentralized production, mass 
movements, organized democratic structures, and conscious revolutionary 
leadership.  
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The Planned Economy: A Rational Ecology 
 
Planned Economy 
 
Marxists call for a “rational ecology” to constitute humanity’s interactions 
with the broader environment. A rational ecology uses humanity’s unique ability 
to consciously determine our material interactions with the environment, via 
labor and production, to control our social metabolism in line with the universal 
metabolism of nature. The planned economy is the primary mechanism for 
reconstituting society’s relations to labor and environment alike. As Cuba, and 
the later U.S.S.R., demonstrated, a planned economy is not automatically a 
worker’s democracy. However, the planned economy represents progress from 
the anarchy and overriding profit-motive of capitalism.  
The planned economy of Cuba has represented concrete gains for the 
Cuban people that must be defended. This does not excuse the political regime 
of Castro and the Communist Party of Cuba from critique. But even hamstrung 
by a top-heavy bureaucracy, the planned economy is advantageous compared 
against the anarchy of capitalism (Taaffe 2000). Since imperialists were so 
deeply intertwined in the Cuban system, the capitalist democratic revolution 
could only be carried out against the resistance of capitalists nationally and 
internationally. Such conditions compelled Castro and the new regime to lean 
on the power of the Cuban masses and to go beyond the capitalist framework 
by nationalizing big business and establishing a planned economy (Taaffe 
2000). Cuba’s planned economy provided universal healthcare and education, 
guaranteed food rations, affordable housing, and accessible public utilities. It 
increased industrial production by 50% from 1959 to 1965 (Taaffe 2000). In 
1975 the economic growth rate hit 9% (Taaffe 2000). Nickel has overtaken 
tobacco production as the second most valuable export and steel production is 
slated to hit about one million tons (Taaffe 2000). Given the rigors of the 
embargo it represents a striking achievement. But it pales in comparison to 
what might have been achieved by the conscious planning and empowerment 
of the producers themselves. 
Socialism cannot exist without democracy. For a period, bureaucratic 
regimes can play a “relatively progressive” role in developing industry and 
society (Taaffe 2000). Eventually the regime swallows up more and more of the 
surplus, “clogs up the pores of society” and prevents it from going any further 
forward. The plan begins to disintegrate and the economy and society regress 
(Taaffe 2000). In attempting to correct its errors, the regime swings widely 
from one extreme to the other, causing damage on both sides. Trotsky 
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addressed the blunders of forced agricultural collectivization which led to mass 
food shortages, arguing that a “correct correlation” between industry and 
agriculture is impossible on the basis of a “regime of bureaucratic absolutism”  
because it alienates the peasantry and proletariate alike, and destroys the 
developing collective motivation necessary in a socialist order (Taaffe 2000). 
The planned economy in Cuba was not a clean revolution in the social 
relations of production. The compulsion to nationalize certain industries, in the 
face of pressure from the United States on the right and the ignited masses on 
the left, preceded the development of alternative social relations represented 
by dual structures like soviets. In the 1917 Russian Revolution, the ultimate 
transfer of power from the Provisional Government to the Revolutionary 
Government occurred without significant bloodshed because the working class 
had already taken control of the essential running of society through 
widespread participation in workplace councils (Collins 1987). The democratic 
structures that would make up the first stage of socialist society were created 
through, and advanced, the struggle to win power. Thus, the nationalization of 
resources was preceded by the taking of state power by the mass of society. 
The democratization of the economy was accomplished by passing all 
remaining control of production to the soviets, out of which representatives of 
the democratic bodies of the new state were elected. Additionally, the nature of 
the state was revolutionized by the practical participation of the masses (up 
until the stringencies of the Civil War decimated said capacity). The nature of 
revolutionary practice and theory in Cuba prior to 1959 informed the nature of 
the state which resulted. 
As described previously, the Cuban Revolution of 1959 was a nationalist 
revolution. Grassroots democratic organizations existed in the prior struggle as 
some independent unions, militant strike committees, Committees in Defense of 
the Revolution, and alternative organizations like the Cuban Bolshevik-Leninist 
Party (PBL). However, due to the politically confusing role of the Communist 
Party of Cuba and the long-standing collaborationism between the main unions’ 
leadership and the puppet state, the independent organization of the working 
class was subsumed to the bourgeoisie anti-imperialist struggle. Grassroots 
democratic structures never took widespread control of production and, with 
the main bodies of workers organization being state-backed unions, mass 
leadership and mass participation were not explicitly developed. 
The great advantages of the planned economy have been undermined 
by “mismanagement, tremendous waste and zigzags in economic policy” made 
inevitable by the lack of “planning, checking, control and initiative which is only 
possible through workers’ democracy” (Taaffe 2000). Bureaucratic bungling has 
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cost the planned economy much of its greatest advantages. The waste of 
resources in “staggering” (Szulc 2000). In 1963, Castro accepted 1,000 tractors 
from the USSR to mechanize the sugar harvest of a type that were incapable of 
processing sugar cane (Taaffe 2000). The error was only discovered upon their 
arrival. These kinds of arbitrary decisions, and the production of low quality 
goods that result, are the inevitable result of a system in which decision makers 
are not subject to mass input, criticism, election, and recall (Taaffe 2000). The 
authoritarian position Castro occupied atop the Cuban bureaucracy made the 
entire national economy subject to his personal whims. Castro’s “impatience led 
him into continuous shifts between short-, medium- and long-term planning as 
well as into endless improvisations. No policy was given reasonable time to 
succeed (or to be proved unsatisfactory), and political or visionary pressures 
pushed Castro into grandiose projects the economy could not possibly handle.” 
(Szulc 2000). 
 Thus far, the Cuban bureaucracy has played a relatively progressive role 
in developing industry. The state imported the techniques of advanced 
countries, but this tactic creates colossal overheads. Development of industry 
means the parallel growth of the working class and, with it, the increasing 
demand for workers’ democracy (Taaffe 2000). At some point in time, perhaps 
the current one, the bureaucratic caste will become “an absolute fetter on the 
further development of society” (Taaffe 2000). In Russia, the collapse of the 
USSR saw the reestablishment of capitalism. Cuba is slowly sliding deeper into 
capitalist relations every year, but the potential to turn things around still 
remains.  
 The planned economy humanizes its labor and revolutionizes its 
productivity by freeing the “creative intellect” of each producer. The 
humanization of labor reconnects our work with the most fundamental effort to 
reproduce and improve life - however “improve” may be qualitatively defined - 
while freeing the complete potential of human intellect and creativity to pursue 
that means. Marxism laments how no form of society thus far has freed the 
collective intelligence of our species. Such empowerment would allow humanity 
to share and codify the practical knowledge which already exists among 
peasants, craftspeople and workers, derived from accumulated experience, and 
employ it to our communal benefit. For crises we cannot yet resolve, it 
empowers us to use all of our resources to collectively pursue a solution.  
 Humanizing labor allows us to finally meet the needs of our species as a 
whole. The production process creates those goods we want, while the labor 
process is informed by the empowerment and security of workers. The planned 
economy under democratic worker’s control is the most effective means for 
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accomplishing the changes deemed necessary by degrowth: meeting actual 
human need, re-defining what people want and need to be produced, replacing 
extraneous or overly-costly goods and services with appropriate alternatives, 
cutting waste within the production process, internalizing the environmental 
and social costs of current and historical production, and additional mechanisms 
which improve collective wellbeing while rebalancing the social metabolism. 
Rational agroecosystems can resolve alienation of both the environment and 
labor by trading the “impractical goal” of complete human control over nature 
with self-regulating systems where “we can get away with not controlling most 
of what happens and rely on the resilience, robustness, and feedbacks in the 
system to ensure that our needs are met” (Haila and Levins 1992). With 
socially-determined production, improvements in labor productivity will result in 
more time and leisure, not more profit. As humans are fundamentally material 
organisms in a material environment, the resolution of alienated of labor and 
external means of production are the task of a rational ecology. Agroecology is 
a nexus for emerging rational ecology which abandons the traditional ivory 
tower of science for the accumulated wisdom of agricultural laborers. 
 Agroecology proves a wealth of undervalued environmental knowledge 
already exists in the world. Humanity has been sufficiently attuned to our 
surroundings to be able to survive and co-evolve with our environment for 
millennia. Dialectics take the progress of the past and build upon it. 
Agroecology is the search for a “rational ecology” in agriculture spurred by 
repeated historical crises in food production. This scientific discipline illustrates 
the historically and materially dialectical relationship by adding to surviving 
traditional ecological knowledge the rigor of scientific analysis. 
 Agroecology has blossomed in Cuba’s protected space thanks to the 
social-orientation of Cuban production and the unintended freedom from 
capitalism secured by the embargo. But agroecology in Cuba today faces a 
moment of conflict between capitalist organization of labor and a higher 
socialist form of production. The widespread adoption of agroecology is 
incompatible with capitalism. Agroecology and degrowth elements in Cuba face 
worsening pressures from capitalist forces today, as the US revises its embargo 
policies and Raul Castro’s government increasingly privatizes the gains of the 
revolution. The ideological shelter that the absence of cheap US imports 
provided is no longer as strong a factor. While capitalism attempts to eradicate 
centers of agroecology, the planned economy is capable of expanding the 
development and implementation of agroecological knowledge on the largest 
scale. 
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Nationalization 
 
 Castro’s Cuba places much of its claim to be “socialist” on the resolute 
rejection of capitalism demonstrated by broad nationalization efforts. 
Nationalization implies the state ownership and management of production. 
However, nationalization does not automatically imply the socialization of 
production, if the state is not under the democratic control of the masses. From 
first claiming that "for the record, [we] have no plans for the expropriation or 
nationalisation of foreign investments… I personally have come to feel that 
nationalisation is, at best, a cumbersome instrument”, conditions pushed Castro 
to nationalize the entirety of the retail sector, from the auto mechanic shops to 
the sandwich and ice-cream street vendors (George 1958). The expropriation of 
landlordism and capitalism was carried through step by step under mass 
pressure.  
 Cuba first expropriated those industries that the imperialist countries 
tried to use to blackmail the new regime, that is, land, oil, utilities, and the 
sugar industry, all of which were dominated by US finance. The nationalization 
effort and the anti-imperialist struggle seemed one and the same, but required 
either financial compensation for expropriation or the rejection of capitalism. In 
a later policy zigzag, Castro moved to nationalize all small business. The 
government claimed that Cuba was now the "socialist country with the largest 
nationalised sector". But they failed to appropriately evaluate the economic 
conditions, and to “eliminate every small business without first of all creating 
the conditions whereby the state trusts are in a position to supply the goods – 
particularly the consumer goods – and services provided by these firms added 
enormously to the general scarcity of certain goods which in turn led to 
growing discontent” (Taaffe 2000). The campaign was intended partly to cut 
down the privileges of the bureaucracy, and partly to accumulate the necessary 
resources for industrialization and the mechanization of agriculture, but the 
undialectical process contradicted and undermined productive capabilities rather 
than accurately acknowledging them and formulating an appropriate plan 
(Taaffe 2000). 
Degrowth requires a revolution in the productive relations of society, but 
they must be disrupted and reformed for a purpose. Land nationalization 
contributed greatly to the country’s ability to adopt degrowth practices. 
Because the state controlled the land, they were in a position to respond rapidly 
to the sudden crisis in 1989. The state gave free access to people capable and 
willing to use land, especially any open urban space, to cultivate whatever scale 
of food possible. Where possible, the state aided producers with training, 
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seeds, traction animals, and tools. It demonstrated, in contradiction to the 
mass state farms of the 1960’s, that nationalization was not explicitly tied to a 
given scale or method of production, but that these are socially determined 
forms. In social conditions of a reduced state, limited mobility, and few other 
means of accessing the necessary goods, the policy of nationalized lands was 
logically adapted to widespread small-scale distribution. The success of this 
policy was supported by the prior nationalization of supporting industries, 
including healthcare, utilities, and housing, which reinforced the productive 
capacity and relative security of households.  
 
Centralized Planning; Decentralized Production 
 
 Despite the power of dialectics to understand this relation of human to 
world, researchers - subjective and inherently political creatures that we are - 
struggle to reconcile a Marxist planned economy with regional heterogeneity. 
Ecologies, especially, cannot be treated uniformly. The concept of 
“centralization” seems to connote “homogenization”, which ecologists and 
geographers recognize to be too removed from the material context of people 
and place to function resiliently. The global spread of the Green Revolution 
thoroughly demonstrates the danger of a blunt top-down approach to the 
environment. Yet the answer to these nested spatialities lies in the democratic 
and organizational forms of scientific socialism: 
 
Capitalist exploitation and one-plan command-economy are not the only alternatives. 
The unit of production and unit of planning are not the same. Unit of remuneration is 
larger than the unit of production. That is, productive units should have free space for 
decisions…But constraints should be set not only from the market but also from societal 
principles such as: first, production so that it takes care of people’s demands; second, 
bans on dangerous production; and third, collective needs must be subsidized because 
they do not create the “effective demand” required according to a market economy 
ideal. Local production may be necessary even though it would not be equally profitable 
as complete division of labor among specialized regions. This is to avoid intermediate 
costs (transportation, storage losses both in quantity and in quality) and also to 
preserve production potentialities; as a hedge against uncertainty; to even the use 
value of products; and to ensure uniform demand of labour at all localities. (Haila and 
Levins 1992) 
 
 The debate around centralized planning emerges in degrowth, in part, 
because ecology raises a challenging question - the question of scale. The 
notion of scale frames one of the conceptual challenges of centralized planning, 
which is the dynamic between the specific and general, of concreteness and 
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theory. While the specifics must be worked out in practice, the nature of 
collaborative planning is best suited for jumping such scales. Socially-driven 
production rebalances the equation between costs which might seem mutually 
exclusive under the profit-logic of capitalism, but which can be satisfactorily 
arranged through a collaborative planned economy, even with the additional 
challenge of internalizing former externalities. Haila and Levins (1992) describe 
the potential layers of organized production based on the use-values of 
ecological systems at varying scales:  
 
“while individual patches of crop or other activity should be small enough to allow for 
the advantages [of personalized labor], the whole array of patches may be quite 
large…The maximization of benefit for the ensemble as a whole, no matter how benefit 
is defined, is different from the maximization of benefit from each patch separately. But 
if some patches will be more productive than others, and may be devoted to less 
productive activities than would be possible in order to improve the whole, people 
deriving income from single patches of vegetation will be unequally rewarded for efforts 
that are equally hard…Rather, renumeration should in some way reflect the productivity 
of the whole set of patches. Therefore the problem of scale requires combining the 
advantages of detailed local adaptation with larger scale coordination. How that 
coordination is to be achieved cannot be settled by economic argument.” (Haila and 
Levins 1992) 
 
 The concept of centralization also raises the concern of authoritarianism. 
This concern is largely influenced by the assumption, under capitalism, that 
politics and economics are separate realms, and while they influence each 
other, democracy is for politics and “individual choice” reigns supreme in 
economics. Cuba does demonstrate the weaknesses of an authoritarian 
economy. But the workers’ state seeks to bring democracy into the economy, 
and so make the realms of politics and society truly democratic too.  
 
 
Workers’ Democracy 
 
The Soviet Union emerged from the October Revolution as a workers' state. State 
ownership of the means of production, a necessary prerequisite to socialist 
development, opened up the possibility of rapid growth of the productive forces. But 
the apparatus of the workers' state underwent a complete degeneration at the same 
time: it was transformed from a weapon of the working class into a weapon of 
bureaucratic violence against the working class and more and more a weapon for the 
sabotage of the country's economy. - Leon Trotsky, The Transitional Programme (The 
Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International). 1938 
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Democratic Organizations 
 
 Layered democratic workers’ organizations building up to the national 
and international levels start from roots in the workplace and community. 
Committees at each level are comprised of elected representatives subject to 
recall and receiving the same salary and benefits of the average representee. 
This layered organization enables local input, as both direct proposals and 
votes, to feed into centralized decision-making bodies who, having gathered 
input from across the region, can synthesize the needs, desires, and capabilities 
of localities into an overarching plan. Organizational centralization cannot be 
confused with geographic centralization, geographic homogenization, or 
authoritarianism. 
 These democratic organs - soviets, councils, committees in defense of 
the revolution - whatever they may be called, they are the training grounds for 
revolutionaries, the heart of the movement, and the foundation of the new 
state. The demand for soviets is a transitional method to create “organs of 
popular struggle” which demonstrate to workers and peasants their own 
strength and demonstrate the possibility of a different kind of society. Their 
formation contributes to raising the necessary consciousness for, as well as the 
practical training in, democratic production and democratic politics. To call for 
democratic organs “only at the point of the proletarian insurrection ‘would only 
lead, as was so tragically demonstrated by the Stalinist policy in China, to the 
failure to organize soviets in time as the revolutionary center and instrument of 
workers and peasants, or else to caricature soviets after the revolutionary wave 
had receded’” (Tennant 2000). Despite the political weaknesses of the main 
Communist Party, there existed Cuban organizations building, on the ground, 
prior to 1959, who consistently called for the formation of democratic organs 
and the organized leadership of the Cuban proletariate, including the small but 
well-oriented Bolshevik-Leninist Party (PBL).  
 Marxists consistently call for soviets because only a struggle and a state 
based on the democratic organizations of workers, peasants, and soldiers can 
create the worker’s state. How to democratic workplace committees become a 
new state? Haila and Levins (1992) highlight how “human individuals mold 
themselves through the very activities they get involved in.” Practical action is 
the starting point for emancipation. Humans are tied to the actions that 
materially reproduce their lives, and under capitalism that reproduction is tied 
to highly controlling and exploitative work. We must confront those realities and 
reclaim them as liberating forces. Productive units form a critical link in which 
autonomy and consciousness develop together; equity, empowerment, 
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democracy, and participation are seen as imperatives that increase people’s 
ability to act (Haila and Levins 1992). 
 Democracy is not pursued as an ideological principle but a material one. 
Popular participation is an “imperative when the political systems of the future 
are envisaged. There is ample evidence that things go astray if it is lacking. 
Participation requires that preconditions for participation be met. Popular 
participation is a former ‘means’ becoming an “end” in the era of the ecological 
crisis” (Haila and Levins 1992). In the Soviet Union, and later Cuba, the 
continued use of undemocratic and exploitive social relations of work only 
reinforced the alienation of labor from production. Socialism is the transition 
period in which people are healed from the damages of capitalism - like the 
very real fear of unemployment meaning death. But the development of new 
collective social motivation takes time, and alienation created under capitalism 
can persist in undemocratic alternatives as worker indifference to production 
(Haila and Levins 1992). Democratic organs in which workers are genuinely 
empowered help resolve the tensions of labor under socialism, between 
autonomy and organization, and security and discipline.  
 The Stalinist bureaucracy deliberately supported undemocratic “workers” 
revolutions that didn’t risk inspiring their own masses to organize and rise up 
again in new democratic revolution. Science and technology were developed 
and disseminated as aid, to countries like Cuba, on that undemocratic, 
undialectical basis, and in a manner re-enforcing undemocratic and undialectical 
processes. Thus, while Cuba and the U.S.S.R. could surpass the inefficiencies of 
capitalist agriculture and make genuine productive gains, the bureaucracy’s 
need to protect their class positions hampered their continued progress.  
 The active impediment and disassembling of worker’s organizations 
broke the dialectical link between worker and production process, and 
hampered the system’s ability to adapt or improve. In agricultural terms, the 
nationalized and centralized food system was closed to learning from worker 
experience or incorporating scientific and technological advances growing out of 
the working class. Certain groups like campesinos saw improved living and 
working conditions under the revolutionary regime. Yet their traditional 
knowledge was displaced by Soviet-style agronomy despite the co-evolutionary 
and solid scientific foundation of the farmers and their agro-environments.  
 The apparent conflict between socialist states and environmental 
sustainability directly derives from the incomplete worker’s democracy. The 
Soviet Union is often criticized for its ecological destruction. That ecological 
destruction resulted from the Soviet planned economy’s orientation towards the 
maximum rapid expansion of production. The policy decision to maximize 
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production at all labor and environmental costs did not derive from the 
collective decision of the masses. The bureaucracy reinforced this policy 
direction with its heavy, inflexible, and inefficient organization of planning, and 
deliberate suppression of the need and voices of individuals and groups (Foster 
2015; Haila and Levins 1992). While destructive activities were backed by 
powerful ministries, concern for the environment was much more 
administratively diffuse without a single strong power base (Haila and Levins 
1992). Environmental consciousness was suppressed alongside all popular 
initiatives. Thus, as the political decisions of the bureaucracy shaped society, 
those decisions acquired a material base (Haila and Levins 1992).  
 However, despite the parallels between Russia and Cuba, and their 
mutual interactions, we must accurately characterize each movement in its 
concrete conditions. Cuba, unlike the Soviet Union, was never a healthy 
worker’s state or even a healthy worker’s state with “bureaucratic 
deformations”, but a bureaucratically deformed workers’ state (Taaffe 2000). It 
is one task to “reform” the bureaucratic deformations of a worker’s state with 
increased worker’s control and management and the spread of the international 
revolution. It is another task entirely to democratize a bureaucratically 
deformed workers’ state in which a bureaucratic caste has separated itself from 
the control of the masses. What becomes necessary is not a ‘reform’ but the 
“complete change of political regime which in turn requires a political 
revolution” (Taaffe 2000). The Soviet Union eventually reached this stage, but 
Cuba has been characterized so since 1959. All interactions of the state with 
the working class and adaptations to changing conditions must be understood 
in this context. So necessary development of democratic worker’s organizations 
requires the second half of the socialist struggle - the organization of a mass 
movement.  
 
Mass Movements 
 
 Marxists organize the working class because of its fundamental role in 
modern society. When the proletariat works, society runs. When the proletariat 
stops, society stops. But this power cannot be exerted on an individual basis. 
The collective action of any group is greater than the sum of its parts. 
Organizing allows us to realize collective power by bringing people together to 
discuss and decide and act in unity. Action at key points of society can have 
disproportionate effects, but the action and the broader movement still 
presuppose a mass nature.  
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 Cuba demonstrates the role of mass movements in two scenarios. 
Degrowth studies Cuba’s alternative agriculture as a movement based on the 
extent it reached across geographic space and demographic participation. This 
work discusses the political revolution as the mass class movement which 
informs the context in which alternative agriculture had to, could, and did 
emerge in a qualitatively different fashion. A mass movement is not inherently a 
class-based movement, much less a full-on workers’ revolution, but a workers’ 
revolution does require a mass class-based movement. Despite its political 
confusion, Cuba’s 1959 revolution was a genuine expression of mass 
frustration, mass energy, and mass determination. The majority of Cuban 
society stood up and threw off the chains of world imperialism, shaking the 
foundations of global capitalism. 
The common narrative of the Cuban Revolution credits 200 
insurrectionaries with carrying through the political revolution. That narrative is 
reciprocally reinforced by the cult-of-personality maintained around Fidel 
Castro. The majority of organizations, from M26J to the PSP, and to some 
extent even the PBL, sought to sharpen the revolutionary crisis rather than to 
deepen the conciseness, organization amongst broad sections of the urban and 
rural masses. Crisis before preparation is dangerous. Socialist organization 
necessitates mass movements, mass leadership, and mass empowerment. Its 
social-orientation, which includes, through our material natures, an ecological-
orientation, facilitates degrowth by enacting collective decisions. 
Substitutionalism, where a small group attempts to fulfill the role of the mass 
working class, shaped the revolutionary movement in Cuba and shapes the 
planned economy. Castro and the bureaucracy cannot comprehend or follow 
the necessary path for the planned economy in isolation from the knowledge 
and decisions of the working class. The mass movement of people organized 
through democratic committees and councils is necessary to bring workers and 
peasants to power in their workplaces, their sectors, and across society.  
 
Conscious Revolutionary Leadership 
 
“The significance of the subjective factor – the aims, the conscious method, the party – 
Lenin well understood and taught this to all of us…The objective prerequisites for the 
proletarian revolution have not only “ripened”; they have begun to get somewhat 
rotten. Without a socialist revolution, in the next historical period at that, a catastrophe 
threatens the whole culture of mankind. The turn is now to the proletariat, i.e., chiefly 
to its revolutionary vanguard. The historical crisis of mankind is reduced to the crisis of 
the revolutionary leadership. - Leon Trotsky, The Transitional Programme (The Death 
Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International). 1938 
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 Historians debate so heavily about the political nature of the Cuban 
revolution is because it was a contradictory political situation. The M26J which 
brought Fidel Castro to power was a deliberately ambiguous and incoherent 
political grouping that sought to unite the Cuban peasantry, working class, 
union militants, local landowners, and weak bourgeois in the anti-imperialist 
struggle. The movement could not take an explicit political stance without 
risking alienation of part of their constituency.  
 Their primary challenger and collaborator in the struggle for power was 
the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). The PSP, later to become the official Cuban 
Communist Party, followed the line of the Third Communist International, which 
degenerated into the international arm of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The 
primary concern of the Soviet bureaucracy was the preservation of their 
position against the opposing pressures of global capitalism and the potential 
for a true worker’s revolution igniting from below. Theory and practice were 
thus distorted in the work of those parties that adhered to the political lines of 
the Third International. Such misleading perspectives can mean life-or-death for 
workers in the crucible of struggle. The PSP demonstrated the same abrupt 
policy “zig-zags” of the Soviet Union, and later the Castro regime, as the 
bureaucratic elite attempted to correct their political lines without the combined 
intellect and constant feedback of internal democratic participation. The political 
positions of the Third International parties had crucial effects on the 
development of the organizations and leadership of the proletariate and their 
ultimate ability to take power for a fully socialist state.  
 The Bolshevik-Leninist Party of Cuba split from the PSP and the Third 
International over the degeneration of the worker’s democracy. Trotsky and the 
Fourth International maintained the perspective that the socialist revolution 
could not succeed without the international struggle (internationalism), nor was 
each country doomed to pass through a capitalist stage when, with 
international solidarity, the working class was capable of leaping two steps at 
once (Trotsky 2010). The PLB rejected the Soviet bureaucracy as a “‘privileged 
caste’ which had broken with the concept of ‘proletarian revolution’ and which 
had consolidated a ‘Bonapartist state and an anti-proletarian dictatorship of the 
back of the Soviet masses” (Tennant 2000). Rather than using the bureaucracy 
to delegitimize socialism, they and the Fourth International the “entrusted the 
gains of the October Revolution to the working class across the world” 
(Tennant 2000). The PBL called for the defense and expansion of these gains 
by the same methods which had brought the worker’s democracy to power in 
1917.  
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 Tennant (2000) maps the struggles of Cuban Trotskyists to organize in a 
country with weak class-based institutions. Though imperialism had rendered 
the national bourgeoisie largely ineffectual in the aftermath of the War of 
Independence, the historic defeat of the 1930’s revolutionary movement had 
also destroyed the independent working-class movement. The exceptional 
weakness of class formations was further exacerbated post-1935 by a 
Bonapartist regime that sought to co-opt elements of the various classes into a 
governing entente. Collaborationism between Batista and the Stalinist PCC 
granted the state-backed Communists power to blunt attempts to renew class-
based opposition to the capitalist dictatorship. The main task of the PBL was 
not to stir further unrest, which harsh conditions already made inevitable, but 
to sharpen class consciousness so that workers could emerge victoriously this 
time, rather than suffer another devastating defeat. The international 
movement encouraged the PBL to “deepen the revolutionary ferment in even 
broader layers of the masses” rather than follow in the tracks of most 
organizations, who sought to sharpen the near-term political crisis through 
insurrection (Tennant 2000). Building a transitional program for immediate 
action in place of an abstract post-insurrection program of action would shape 
both the struggle and the potential regime that might emerge. 
 
 The PBL released their “consciously thought out program” in 1933. The 
program declared: 
 
For this reason, the Bolshevik Party declares the following in respect of both the 
agrarian and national question, and the content and aims of the agrarian revolution:  
1. The national liberation of Cuba as a semi-colonial country can only be won through 
the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat which, applying the Bolshevik formula, 
‘draws the peasantry behind it’.  
2. The peasant question cannot be underestimated by the proletarian vanguard and still 
less in these semi-colonial and agrarian countries. The victory of the agrarian revolution 
depends upon which class the peasantry follows, the proletariat or the bourgeoisie.  
3. The formula issued by the leaders of the Communist Party concerning the 
development of the agrarian revolution, its slogans of struggle, the confusion on the 
question of the mechanics of state power -- in whose hands it should reside -- all this 
must be discarded. In its stead should be placed the slogan of the agrarian and anti-
imperialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat in alliance with the 
peasantry.  
4. The ultimate victory of the proletarian revolution can only be won by the 
development and triumph of the world proletarian revolution. The Bolshevik Party 
therefore recognises the necessity of effectively joining our movement with the worker 
and peasant masses of the entire world, and specifically of the United States and Latin 
America.  
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5. It is necessary to take advantage of all the conjunctures in order to unite the 
proletariat with the peasantry, and to develop the agrarian revolution to its conclusion. 
If the proletariat does not secure the support of the peasant masses in advance, if it 
does not manage to ‘draw them behind’ itself, it is then utopian even to think of the 
victory of the revolution in Cuba.  
6. The native bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie, rural as well as urban, are incapable, 
organically and ideologically, of leading the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed 
people to its ultimate end. All conciliation with these elements with respect to the 
specific purposes of the revolution is nothing other than treason to the workers and 
peasants. To hand over these forces to a petit-bourgeois leadership is to repeat 
consciously the betrayals in China and Mexico.  
7. The agrarian anti-imperialist revolution will not only fulfil the tasks of the bourgeois 
revolution (liquidation of the feudal forms of production, national liberation, agrarian 
revolution, etc), but must, by the very fact that the bourgeoisie is not the motor force 
in it and that it is carried out without the support of the bourgeoisie and against the 
bourgeoisie, lay the foundations from which the step can be taken to the Socialist 
revolution and the proletarian dictatorship.  
8. Given the character and future development of the agrarian and anti-imperialist 
revolution, only the proletarian vanguard organised in a Bolshevik party can achieve the 
revolutionary alliance of the proletariat and peasantry, and by this accomplish the final 
triumph of the revolution. The so-called Anti- Imperialist Leagues are organically and 
politically incapable of fulfilling these tasks, and are nothing but coarse caricatures of 
the revolutionary ‘united front’. In their place, only the leadership of the proletariat, 
organised in its class party, will be capable of filling this role.  
9. Finally, it is very clear to us that the victory of the agrarian anti-
imperialist revolution can only be guaranteed by the proletarian dictatorship, 
and that this proletarian dictatorship will not appear after the revolution, but 
on the foundation of the revolution itself, as the only force capable of 
achieving the agrarian and anti-imperialist objectives.  
(emphasis added) (Tennant 2000) 
 
 Before his death in 1940, Trotsky “first reiterated his central arguments 
with respect to the task of revolutionaries in the colonial and semi-colonial 
countries; namely, that the conquest of power cannot be the immediate task if 
the majority of the rural and urban petit-bourgeoisie does not follow the 
revolutionary proletarian party, and that this can be achieved only by ‘a direct 
and open struggle against the “national” bourgeoisie and the opportunist 
leaders of the petit-bourgeoisie’. However, for Trotsky, soviets in general 
constituted the basic fighting organisation of the proletariat and those other 
layers of society which joined its struggle” (Tennant 2000). 
 The founding program of the PBL outlined the organizational structure for 
the party, which would serve as a foundation for the worker’s and peasant 
councils-to-be state: “cells” with elected “Cell Committees” answerable to the 
members of the cells, “sections” organized in areas of high cell concentration 
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and “Sectional Conferences” made up of delegates from the member cells with 
the “Sectional Committee” to lead operations between conferences, sections 
grouped into districts with parallel conferences and committees, topped by the 
“National Congress”, formed by delegations from the cells of the PBL with the 
“Central Committee”, elected at the congress, to provide leadership between 
congresses. The organization is guided by the principle of democratic centralism 
which stipulates that following decisions taken at the conclusion of internal 
discussion, the minority has to act on the will of the majority. Such a program, 
as above, would furnish the independent organization of the working class. The 
independence of the working class in its struggle is key to the socialist project 
and one of the failures of the Cuban Revolution.  
 Despite the strength of their perspectives and their heroic work, the PBL 
was never capable of playing the necessary role of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 
the Cuban revolution. Although the PLB put forth correct perspectives in their 
program, discrepancies continuously appeared between the perspectives 
outlined in the party’s principal programmatic documents and the practical work 
of the PBL’s rank and file (Tennant 2000). The “slender roots” of the PBL’s 
formal perspectives proved “too shallow to displace the traditional forms of 
struggle”, and the “PBL as a whole failed to propose a politically independent 
course for the working class (Tennant 2000). As Tennant (2000) describes, 
 
“although the Cuban Trotskyists attempted to interpret the essence of Trotsky’s 
thought in a way which took into account the peculiarities of the Cuban context, they 
never consistently and unambiguously insisted on a central tenet of Trotsky’s theory of 
Permanent Revolution, namely, the necessary proletarian nature of the anti-imperialist 
revolution. That is to say, they did not unequivocally view the working class through its 
own democratic organisations as the leader of the revolutionary process, and 
consequently failed to focus their attentions on forging a conscious proletarian 
leadership for a revolution which was carried out, not only against feudal and 
imperialist interests (the democratic anti-imperialist revolution), but also against 
capitalist relations of production…the Cuban Trotskyists’ failure to make a clear 
differentiation between proletarian and petit-bourgeois anti-imperialist forces in the 
1930s and 1940s ended up with them making increasing political concessions to 
Stalinism in the 1960s.” 
 
 The failure to distinguish this in practice frustrated the PBL’s efforts and 
led to declining membership. The flawed practice of rank-and-file organizing 
stemmed from early political heterogeneity, as the PBL initially emerged from 
the “Left Opposition” expelled from the PSP, rather than emerging from 
principled political agreement (Tennant 2000). The PBL was born   a mass party 
rather than having to solidify shared perspectives  through the process of 
building a grassroots organization from the ground up. This was compounded 
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by the self-recognized lack of a “vibrant” internal party life, that is, of constant 
discussion, education, and debate, resulting in a politically ill-prepared 
membership instead of mass leadership. Of the members who left the PBL, 
those who remained loyal to the revolutionary project effectively identified the 
M26J as another “petit-bourgeois vehicle for revolution” in line with their 
previous tactics, and settled into the open struggle for a democratic anti-
imperialist revolution, with no attempt to build a Trotskyist vanguard party or 
faction to try and push the forces of petit-bourgeois nationalism gently towards 
socialism (Tennant 2000).  
 Both nationally and regionally, parties of the Fourth International 
struggled to remain orientated towards the social power of the working class 
through the mid-1900’s. After the devastating defeats of the “flower” of the 
proletariate in Germany, China, and Spain, and the unforeseen post-war 
upswing, the working class was lulled into relative political quiescence. Marxism 
bases itself upon the working class for its material role in production and 
society; the working class is the only class, organized by big industry which 
possesses the potential collective power and consciousness to carry through the 
socialist revolution. Other classes like the middle class and peasantry are too 
heterogeneous to collectively realize their class interests. The upper layers look 
towards the capitalists and the lower poorer sections tend to merge with the 
working class (Taaffe 2000). In the complexity of neo-colonial conditions the 
peasantry can play an auxiliary role in the transformation of society in alliance 
with the working class but the main driver remains the working class (Taaffe 
2000).  
 The objective conditions for revolution come time and time again as each 
system creates both its crisis and the seeds for a new possibility. The subjective 
factor, that is the leadership and preparedness of the revolutionary movement, 
is not set in stone. So while a different political strategy might not have 
resulted in a proletarian anti-imperialist revolution in 1959, such an orientation 
might have kept a tradition of working-class political independence alive for a 
moment of crisis like today (Tennant 2000). As the current political leadership 
see no way out of the current economic crisis, they are reopening the country 
to capitalist social relations. As in the Soviet Union before its collapse, the only 
way to protect and follow through with the gains of the 1959 revolution is for 
the working class to organize in force again. The Russian Revolution of 1917 
was carried through by the working class with the leadership of a conscious 
Marxist party. The revolutionary overthrow of landlordism and capitalism across 
the neo-colonial world after 1945 was characterized instead by the struggles of 
the rural masses (Taaffe 2000). The limitations of the current Cuban regime are 
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fundamentally tied to this characterization. But despite overly complex political 
“negotiations” pursued by experts and politicians, the answers to Cuba’s crisis is 
simple. The well-being of Cuba’s people and land is dependent on the revival of 
the working class’s independent movement for political strength.  
 
 
 
Lessons from Cuba to Inform Degrowth 
 
 This paper has deconstructed both degrowth theory and degrowth’s 
primary empirical study – Cuban agroecology. Though a historical materialist 
analysis, I have argued that the degrowth project has lived within the socialist 
project since the early work of Marx and Engels. A study of Cuba illustrates how 
Marxist theory, even imperfectly applied, created a country which could 
withstand a catastrophic economic collapse and come out the other side with a 
revolutionary food system and continued commitment to human well-being. 
The rise of alternative agriculture as agroecology in Cuba reinforces degrowth 
claims that capitalism, and the system’s drive for eternal growth, are 
incompatible with our continued existence on this material planet. It is clear 
that a societal contraction back inside of the planetary boundaries necessitates 
a new production system. Cuba represents the largest transition from formerly 
hyper-resource-intensive agriculture to a more rational agroecological system. 
Materially analyzed, the histories of Cuba’s degrowth transition and elements 
argues that the degrowth project is part and parcel of the socialist one and 
necessitates: a planned economy with the nationalization of resources and 
centralizing planning, and worker’s democracy enacted through mass 
movements, organized democratic structures, and a conscious revolutionary 
leadership. 
 Using dialectical and historical materialism, I have tried to accomplish 
three tasks: 1) outline the incorporation of the degrowth project in existing 
Marxist thought, 2) accurately map Cuba’s agricultural history as relates to the 
concrete social organization of production, and 3) argued for the necessity of a 
successful worker’s democracy for the pursuit of degrowth through the most 
concrete case study available.  
 The environmental incompatibility between capitalism and our planet is a 
foundational concept of Marxism. The Marxist concepts of the universal 
metabolism of nature and the social metabolism of a given societal form is a 
powerful conceptual tool for understanding the basic relationship between 
human society and the “external means” of our reproduction, identifying the 
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fundamental ecological crisis of capitalism, and defining the conditions of a new 
ecologically-rational society. Marxist materialism broadens the intentions of 
degrowth to include an analysis of the whole of the material relation of 
humanity to the environment, including our socially-constructed institutions and 
paradigms. The concrete environmental crises which birthed the degrowth 
movement are the same conditions that open up the opportunity to create a 
revolutionary new system.  
 Cuba appears repeatedly in the degrowth literature because it is a 
concrete case of a national-scale degrowth scenario. The collapse of the USSR 
deprived Cuba, practically overnight, of its primary source of industrial 
agricultural inputs, its main market for monoculture sugar, and its cheapest 
source of oil, manufactured goods, and other items that kept the production 
and distribution systems functional. As neither the United States relented its 
embargo nor the Castro regime conceded full sail to global capitalism, the 
Cuban people and state were forced to adapt the national food system to low-
input local agriculture or face starvation. Multiple new social organizations of 
production were employed to complete the necessary work, including the 
break-up of rigidly hierarchical state farms into smaller, more worker-controlled 
collectives, the explosion of urban and peri-urban agriculture, the revitalization 
of campesino farms and culture, and the reinvigoration of autoconsumo 
practices. These adaptations are demonstrating an ecologically rational 
agriculture on a scale never seen before - not in continuous hectares cultivated, 
but the number of people involved, the number of households with crops 
planted, and the integration of new systems where food production and every-
day life overlap. This is a crucial example for all who are concerned by the 
converging environmental crises. Even today, though Cuba has flirted with 
socialized production, neither agricultural nor industrial production in Cuba are 
operated under the democratic worker’s control which defines a socialist 
country. Perhaps alternative agriculture will become a space in which worker’s 
struggle against the restoration of capitalism might ignite. 
 Cuba’s complex past, caught first between feudalism and capitalism, and 
today between capitalism and socialism, complicates characterization of the 
country. But Cuba’s current circumstances come concretely from its history. 
Using dialectical and historical materialism, I have traced the material, 
theoretical, and organizational trends that have led to contemporary conditions. 
The Castro regime has consistently put forth socially-oriented policies. They 
have used the planned economy to eradicate illiteracy, provide universal 
healthcare, and secure a ration to ensure food security. These are all massive 
gains considering the incredibly low levels of development prior to the 1959 
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Revolution and the stringencies of the nearly 50 year embargo enforced by the 
world’s superpower. But the Cuban state is undermined by its own political 
nature. The bureaucracy has reached a dead end. It cannot maintain its 
position against the slow erosion of global capitalism, but nor does it wish to 
completely reject capitalism in the only way possible -  by allowing a worker’s 
democracy to come to power. Industrial and agricultural productivity is stymied, 
the gains of the planned economy including healthcare and the ration eroded 
further each year, yet the masses are not yet resigned to the returning 
desolation of capitalism. The political prognosis is such: “either the 
bureaucracy, becoming ever more the organ of the world bourgeoisie in the 
workers' state, will overthrow the new forms of property and plunge the 
country back to capitalism; or the working class will crush the bureaucracy and 
open the way to socialism.” (Trotsky 1981). 
 Cuba has proven that democratic control of the economy, in the face of 
a crisis that involves us all, cannot be gained without ownership of the means 
of production. The nature of production in a state that owns the means of 
production, without mechanisms of democratic control of the state, 
incompletely takes advantage of the power of the planned economy and 
represents inevitable democratic risks, even assuming genuine concern for 
public welfare. Cuba has come as far as it has because power monopolies over 
capital investment enables society to use available, though now necessarily 
limited, resources to meet need within non-negotiable biophysical limits. Even 
imperfect, Cuba has succeeded in providing the highest standard of living for 
the smallest per-capita ecological footprint. But Cuba has reached a turning 
point. Any “misunderstanding of the real lessons of the Cuban Revolution could 
be fatal for the revolutionary forces today. It is therefore not pedantry, or an 
attempt at self-justification, which has led us to take up [this critique]” (Taaffe 
2000). The gains of the Cuban Revolution, for its people and the world at large, 
can only be preserved and surpassed through the power of a worker’s 
democracy.  
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